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This dissertation addresses a family of agricultural and resource problems that emerge 
when biophysical and economic systems are endogenously linked over space and time. 
In particular, we study the spatial-dynamic bioeconomics of the grapevine leafroll 
disease (GLRD) which threatens the economic sustainability of the grape and wine 
industry. The first essay of the dissertation relies on a survey with vineyard managers 
in the Finger Lakes region of New York to assess the economic cost of the grapevine 
leafroll disease and identify optimal nonspatial disease control strategies under an 
array of bioeconomic parameters. The second essay employs cellular automata to 
model the disease spatial-dynamic diffusion for individual plants in a vineyard, 
evaluate nonspatial and spatial control strategies, and rank them based on vineyard 
expected net present values. Nonspatial strategies consist of removing and replacing 
symptomatic grapevines. In spatial strategies, symptomatic vines are removed and 
replaced, and their nonsymptomatic neighbors are virus-tested, then removed and 
replaced if the test is positive. We find that the nonspatial strategies currently 
recommended to the industry are not cost-effective under model baseline parameters. 
In contrast, we find that spatial strategies targeting immediate neighbors of 
symptomatic vines increase the vineyard expected net present value by 18-19% 
 relative to the strategy of no disease control. In the third essay, we model spatial-
dynamic, negative externalities generated by a plant-level disease diffusion process 
between two ecologically connected but independently managed, heterogonous 
vineyards. One vineyard produces high-value wine grapes whereas the other produces 
low-value wine grapes. We embed the computational model in a bargaining game 
between neighboring managers.  We find that, under noncooperative management, it is 
optimal for neither manager to control the disease. Under cooperative management, 
we find it optimal for the high-value manager to spatially control the disease and to 
pay the low-value manager to do similarly. The cooperative solution increases total 
payoffs by 20%. Using mean-preserving price expansions and contractions, we show 
that total payoff decreases with the magnitude of the price differential between the 
neighboring vineyards up to a point where cooperation becomes Pareto-optimal and 
the relationship between heterogeneity and total payoff becomes U-shaped. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Grapevine leafroll disease (GLRD) presently threatens grape harvests in the United 
States and around the world. This viral disease is affecting the economic sustainability 
of the grape and wine industry by reducing yields and negatively affecting wine 
quality. GLRD is primarily introduced to vineyards through infected planting material. 
Once introduced, the disease can be transmitted by insect vectors within a vineyard 
block and between neighboring blocks or vineyards.   
 Vineyard managers are currently advised to avoid introducing GLRD into their 
vineyards by planting certified vines derived from virus-tested mother plants. Where 
GLRD is already present, disease management consists mainly of minimizing the 
source of inoculum by roguing symptomatic vines after harvest, especially the young 
ones and replacing them with virus-tested vines. With a few notable examples, little is 
known about the economic effects of GLRD. In fact, most GLRD research has focused 
on the pathogens with less work on disease ecology and disease management.  
 The case of GLRD diffusion and control in vineyards is a specific application 
of a family of agricultural and resource problems that are encountered when 
biophysical and economic systems are linked over space and time. These spatial-
dynamic problems pose the familiar economic question of optimal effort allocation but 
focus on the spatial and temporal dimensions of resource management in the presence 
of spatial-dynamic externalities. In addition to providing results that are valuable to 
specific industries, this line of research addresses the increasing need of (and interest 
in) integrating the study of dynamic microeconomic and biophysical processes, over 
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both time and space, at the individual rather than the population level. Using GLRD as 
a case study, we offer a plant-level, spatial-dynamic, bioeconomic modeling approach 
that addresses these needs. From an industry perspective, this specific application is 
particularly important because it illustrates how the integration of spatial disease 
ecology in a plant-level, spatial-dynamic, bioeconomic model can inform the 
formulation of novel disease control strategies. These strategies are based on 
individual age-infection state, location, and plant neighborhood state, rather than 
visual symptoms alone. From a public policy perspective, this application improves 
our understanding of how agent heterogeneity affects strategic behavior and social 
welfare in the presence of negative, spatial-dynamic externalities. 
This dissertation is comprised of three essays. In the first essay, we rely on a 
survey with Cabernet franc vineyard managers in the Finger Lakes region of New 
York to assess the economic cost of the grapevine leafroll disease under the various 
disease management scenarios encountered in the grape and wine industry. This essay 
identifies optimal disease control strategies based on initial disease incidence, extent 
of yield reduction, penalties imposed on fruit quality and vineyard age. 
In the second essay, we examine whether a spatial-dynamic model that 
incorporates disease ecology parameters at the plant level could offer new insights on 
the optimal allocation of disease control effort over space and time. That is, insights 
that would not be possible to obtain from a nonspatial, model with biological 
parameters specified at the aggregate plant population level. In particular we examine 
whether optimal disease control is structured by age and is spatial. To do so, we 
employ cellular automata methods to model the disease spatial-dynamic diffusion at 
3 
the plant level in a single vineyard, evaluate nonspatial and spatial control strategies, 
and rank them based on vineyard expected net present values. We also ask whether 
and how results from such a model can guide research investments in GLRD disease 
ecology, plant pathology, entomology, and plant science.  
In the third essay, we investigate how the optimal solution from the second 
essay is affected in the presence of spatial-dynamic, negative disease externalities. 
Here, we develop a plant-level model with distance- and density-dependent disease 
externalities between two ecologically connected but independently managed 
vineyards. The two neighboring wine grape growers are heterogeneous in the wine 
grape quality they produce, and consequently, in the prices they receive. We embed 
the computational model in a bargaining game between the grape growers and solve 
for the optimal disease management strategies in both vineyard blocks under central 
planner, noncooperative and cooperative disease management settings. We examine 
how heterogeneity affects strategic behavior in disease control and aggregate payoffs 
using prices for Cabernet Sauvignon in the Napa County wine production region in 
California. 
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CHAPTER 1 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF GRAPEVINE LEAFROLL DISEASE ON VITIS 
VINIFERA CV. CABERNET FRANC IN FINGER LAKES VINEYARDS OF NEW 
YORK 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Grapevine leafroll disease (GLRD) is one of the most widespread viral diseases in 
vineyards. It is reported in almost all grape and wine regions in the United States 
(Fuchs et al. 2009a, Golino et al. 2008, Martin et al. 2005) and worldwide (Charles et 
al. 2009, Freeborough and Burger 2006, Martelli and Boudon-Padieu 2006). GLRD 
causes significant yield losses (up to 30-68%), delays fruit ripening, reduces soluble 
solids and increases titratable acidity in fruit juice (Goheen and Cook, 1959, Martelli 
and Boudon-Padieu 2006, Martinson et al. 2008). Several phloem-limited filamentous 
viruses, designated as grapevine leafroll-associated viruses (GLRaVs), were isolated 
and characterized from leafroll-infected grapevines (Ghanem-Sabanadzovic et al. 
2010, Martelli and Boudon-Padieu 2006). All GLRaVs are readily transmitted via 
vegetative propagation and grafting, and some of them (GLRaV-1, GLRaV-3, 
GLRaV-5 and GLRaV-9) are also vectored by several species of mealybugs 
(Hemiptera: Pseudococcidae) and soft scale insects (Hemiptera: Coccidae) (Martelli 
and Boudon-Padieu 2006, Tsai et al. 2010).   
Vineyard managers adopt varied measures to manage GLRD (Martinson et al. 
2008, Walker et al. 2004). Most of them tend to tolerate the disease without 
controlling it in spite of its evident detrimental impact on yield and fruit quality. Some 
managers, in contrast, replace infected vines with healthy ones (i.e. roguing), while a 
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few of them opt for replanting entire vineyards. Disease control decisions rely on a 
variety of factors but often do not take into account the impact on maturity and berry 
color at harvest. This may be explained by the fact that information about GLRD 
impact on profits is scarce. Therefore, vineyard managers may not make profit-
maximizing decisions regarding GLRD control. 
Little is known about the economic effects of GLRD, with a few notable 
examples. For instance, Walker et al. (2004) examined the impact of GLRaV-3 on 
gross margins in New Zealand vineyards using a model of virus spread under three 
infection scenarios (high, moderate and low) over six growing seasons. These authors 
estimated damages of approximately USD 21,200 per hectare by years 12, 15 and 17 
for the high, moderate and low scenarios, respectively. Based on these results, the 
authors argued that replanting is justified in terms of increased profits by year 6, 8 and 
11 for the same three scenarios, respectively. More recently, Nimmo-Bell (2006) 
employed a Net Present Value (NPV) approach to measure the economic costs of 
GLRaV-3 for V. vinifera cv. Sauvignon blanc and Merlot in New Zealand. The study 
compared the per-hectare NPV of infected and virus-free vineyard blocks under three 
scenarios of disease control: total vine removal in year 6, annual roguing of infected 
vines, and annual roguing of infected and neighboring vines. The authors concluded 
that early vine roguing is more cost-effective than total vineyard replacement in year 
6. Vine roguing reduced the disease impact six-fold for Sauvignon blanc and seven-
fold for Merlot when compared with the ‘no intervention’ scenario. In a study on the 
economic impact of GLRaV-3 on a V. vinifera Cabernet Sauvignon vineyard in the 
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Stellenbosch region of South Africa, Freeborough and Burger (2006) showed that 
roguing was the only viable alternative to increase profits.  
In this study, we estimated the profitability impact of GLRD in grafted V. 
vinifera cv. Cabernet franc in Finger Lakes vineyards of New York. These estimates, 
in turn, were employed to recommend loss-minimizing management strategies for 
disease control. Specifically, the NPV approach was used to compare several GLRD 
control strategies, including roguing, replacing the entire vineyard and doing nothing. 
These management strategies were used to (1) quantify disease damage under several 
scenarios and, (2) identify optimal management strategies based on infection level, 
extent of yield reduction, penalties imposed on fruit quality and vineyard age. 
 
1.2 Materials and Methods 
1.2.1 Survey of vineyard managers.  To construct economic analysis scenarios, a 
survey was conducted among ten vertically-integrated vineyard-winery operations in 
the Finger Lakes region of New York State during the period fall 2009 through spring 
2010. The wineries selected had vineyards with a history of GLRD infection based on 
grafted V. vinifera cultivars, including cv. Cabernet franc, showing typical leafroll 
symptoms or infected with GLRaV -1, GLRaV-2 and/or GLRaV-3, as indicated by 
ELISA and/or RT-PCR (Fuchs et al. 2009b). Respondents provided information about 
perceived ranges of GLRD prevalence, magnitudes of yield reduction due to the 
disease, disease control measures adopted by vineyard managers, and penalties 
incurred due to poor fruit quality (see survey instrument in appendix). The survey 
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included data on all cultivars affected by GLRD. The analysis focused however on 
Cabernet franc for reasons outlined in the discussion section. 
1.2.2 Parameters used in construction of disease management scenarios. The 
survey responses were employed to specify the parameter ranges to be used in 
constructing the analysis scenarios as follows: 
GLRD prevalence. Vineyard managers reported approximately 1, 5 and 40% 
levels of GLRD infection. These values, as well as other prevalence values retrieved 
from the literature, were considered to identify threshold levels that determine 
switching from one management option to another. Vineyard managers recognized 
that the occurrence of GLRD was mainly through infected vines at the time of 
planting. 
Spread of GLRD by vectors. Managers did not recognize a pattern of virus 
spread via mealybug and soft scale insects, in spite of the documented presence of 
vectors species, including viruliferous individuals, in local vineyards (Fuchs et al. 
2009b).The analysis employed a model of GLRaV-3 spread described in Charles et al. 
(2009) to predict levels of virus infection in the presence of vectors. In that model, a 
GLRD prevalence of 50% was predicted in years 6, 8 and 11 for the three vineyards 
studied with low, medium and high GLRD infection risk, respectively, and 90% in 
years 11, 12 and 15 (Charles et al. 2009). The data on GLRD spread over time in the 
medium infection risk case was used to construct this study’s scenario of ‘no GLRD 
control’ (table 1.1, column N).  
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Methods of GLRD control. Vineyard managers practiced roguing (identifying, 
removing and replacing infected vines with vines derived from certified, virus-tested 
vines), replaced entire vineyards with virus-tested certified vines or did not respond to 
GLRD.  
Yield reduction due to GLRD infection. For the most part, vineyard managers 
did not attempt to measure yield reduction due to GLRD. Therefore, the literature was 
reviewed and yield reductions of 30% and 50% were considered, given that 30-68% 
Table 1.1 GLRD prevalence and Cabernet franc yield over time 
Years 
Vines infected (%)  Yield (t/ha) 
N
a
 T1
b
 T5 T40 T60  Healthy  50% reduction
c
 30% reduction
c
 
0 0   - 
d
 - - -  0 0 0 
1 1 - - - -  0 0 0 
2 2 - - - -  0 0 0 
3 8 - - - -  2.2  2.15  2.17  
4 12 1 5 40 60  7.4  6.94  7.12  
5 22 1 3 20 40  7.4  6.58  6.89  
6 28 1 1 10 20  7.4  6.36  6.76  
7 36 1 1 5 10  7.4  6.07  6.58  
8 48 1 1 3 5  7.4  5.62  6.31  
9 60 1 1 1 3  7.4  5.17  6.07 
10 70 1 1 1 1  7.4  4.81  5.84  
11 80 1 1 1 1  7.4  4.43  5.62  
12 88 1 1 1 1  7.4  4.14  5.44  
13 92 1 1 1 1  7.4  3.98  5.35  
14 95 1 1 1 1  7.4  3.87  5.28  
15-19 98 1 1 1 1  7.4  3.76  5.21  
20-25 10
0 
1 1 1 1  7.4  3.69  5.17 
aN: GLRD infection levels derived from the model of Walker et al. (2004) for the no control scenario 
bT1, T5, T40 and T60:  roguing scenarios at 1, 5, 40 and 60% initial infection levels.  GLRD prevalence under roguing 
was assumed to decrease following a stepwise pattern.  
cYield was calculated as %infected vines*yield of infected vines + %healthy vines*yield of healthy vines where yield 
reduction due to GLRD is assumed to be 50% and 30% 
dIt is assumed that GLRD is due to rootstock infection; therefore, 0-3 years old vines do not develop GLRD symptoms. 
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losses are commonly reported (Goheen and Cook 1959, Martelli and Boudon-Padieu 
2006, Martinson et al. 2008, Over de Linden and Chamberlain 1970).  
Alteration of fruit quality due to GLRD infection. The survey quantified quality 
reduction due to increases in titratable acidity and reductions in sugar content of fruit 
juice at harvest. It also identified contractual mechanisms used by buyers to penalize 
poor quality grapes. Vineyard managers did not systematically measure the impact of 
GLRD on fruit juice chemistry. Instead, buyers inspected fruits and measured acidity 
and sugar levels. No vineyard manager reported rejection due to low quality grapes 
but one winery imposed a 10% price penalty when buying grapes that did not meet a 
sugar level requirement ranging from 15 to 21 Brix depending on the cultivar. For that 
reason, two additional scenarios were added (NN30 and NN50) in order to identify 
any effect of the penalty incentive on the vineyard managers’ management decisions.   
Integration of survey data. The answers provided by vineyard managers were 
used to identify parameter values to be considered in the analysis. These parameter 
values were combined to create scenarios under which the economic impact of GLRD 
was estimated. The scenarios are described below and summarized in table 1.2. Given 
that the study focused on Cabernet franc, data collected on GLRD incidence on other 
cultivars (section 2 of survey instrument in supplemental data) were not included in 
the analysis. 
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1.2.3 Scenarios to assess GLRD impact. Various scenarios were constructed, 
reflecting the cash flow of one hectare of V. vinifera cv. Cabernet franc over 25 years 
(the typical lifespan of a vineyard in the Finger Lakes). These scenarios differ by the 
Table 1.2 Description of disease control scenarios 
 Initial 
infection 
level (%) 
Yield reduction 
(%) 
Quality 
penalty 
(%) 
GLD introduction 
a
 
Scenarios  0 30 50 0 10 none infected 
vines 
vectors 
Baseline (B) 0 x   x  x   
No disease 
control (N) b 
         
NN50 1   x x   x x 
NN30 1  x  x   x x 
N50 1   x  x  x x 
N30 1  x   x  x x 
Planting virus-
tested 
certified vines 
(C) 
0 x   x  x   
Roguing 
scenarios  
(T1-T60) 
1-60 x   x   x  
Vineyard 
replacement 
(R) 
any n/a
c
 n/a n/a n/a n/a  x x 
No disease 
control, late 
vector-
mediated 
infection 
(NLV) 
0   x  x   x 
Roguing, late 
vector-
mediated 
infection 
(TLV) 
0 x   x    x 
a GLRD transmission within vineyards  is not included here because it is assumed to be vector mediated in all scenarios 
b NN50: No control, no penalty , 50% yield reduction; NN30:  No control, no penalty , 30% yield reduction; N50: No 
control, 10% penalty, 50% yield reduction; and N30: No control, 10% penalty, 30% yield reduction 
c Not applicable 
11 
biological and managerial parameters reported in the survey. Biological parameters 
include mode of disease transmission (through infected vines at time of planting for 
several levels of initial infection or, later on, through insect vectors) and various levels 
of yield impact (30 or 50% yield reduction). Management parameters, for their part, 
include disease control measures (no control, roguing at infection levels ranging from 
1 to 60%, or entire vineyard replacement) and impact of the disease on price paid for 
the grapes due to quality losses (10% penalty or no penalty). Additional scenarios 
were considered in order to analyze how vineyard age might impact GLRD control 
decisions (ages 12, 16, and 20) and to assess the value of disease prevention by 
planting vines procured from certified, virus-tested stocks. The following scenarios 
were considered, based on the survey responses from vineyard managers:  
Scenario 1: Baseline (B). The baseline scenario consists of a cash flow for one 
vineyard hectare over 25 years with no GLRD prevalence. The baseline scenario was 
employed as a benchmark to estimate the economic impact of GLRD under the 
scenarios described below. To this effect, the GLRD impact was computed as the 
difference between the baseline NPV and the NPV of each alternative scenario.  
Scenario 2: No disease control (N). In this scenario GLRD is introduced in 
year one (either through insect vectors or at planting through infected vines at a level 
of 1%), spreads following the logistic model suggested by Charles et al. (2009), and 
the vineyard manager decides not to rogue or replace the vineyard. Disease spread is 
summarized in table 1.1 where column N lists the percentages of vines infected over 
time. This scenario was analyzed with a yield reduction of 30 and 50%, under either 
no penalty (NN 30 and NN 50) or a 10% penalty rate (N30 and N50) due to lower 
12 
quality grapes. This yielded four scenarios that were used to estimate the economic 
impact of GLRD when no control measures are implemented. 
Scenario 3: GLRD prevention through establishing vineyards with planting 
material derived from certified, virus-tested stocks (C). This scenario simulates a 
situation where the vines used in a planting or replant site are derived from certified, 
virus-free stocks and cost 25% more than conventional vines, based on market prices. 
The NPV of this scenario is used to examine the benefits of a preventative approach to 
GLRD by procuring clean vines at the time of planting in situations where vines of 
poor sanitary status are the only source of infection.  
Scenario 4: Roguing scenarios (T1-T60).  These scenarios correspond to 
situations where GLRD is introduced at planting at different levels ranging from 1 to 
60% (T1-60) via diseased rootstocks and/or scion. Infected vines start developing 
GLRD symptoms in year 4 and are subsequently rogued as they become symptomatic. 
Asymptomatic, infected vines are not identified nor removed and the disease can be 
re-introduced through insect vectors. Therefore, disease prevalence does not drop 
immediately but rather decreases in a stepwise pattern, as initially asymptomatic vines 
develop symptoms over time and are rogued. It is assumed that the disease is never 
eradicated and is controlled at 1% at best. The stepwise decrease in disease prevalence 
is formulated for roguing scenarios with varied initial infection levels (T1, T5, T40 
and T60) (table 1.1). These parameters were used to identify the threshold infection 
level below which roguing is advisable and above which vineyard replacement is the 
appropriate response. In the roguing scenarios, it is assumed that there are no GLRD-
led reductions in yield or quality. 
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Scenario 5: Vineyard replacement (R). In this scenario, the vineyard manager 
decides to replant the entire vineyard at the onset of symptoms in year 4. This scenario 
reflects actions of surveyed managers who are willing to invest in replanting in order 
to avoid the uncertainty of coping with GLRD and to minimize the probability of 
within-vineyard disease spread. The NPV of this scenario was used as a benchmark to 
identify infection level ranges that warrant vineyard replacement instead of roguing.  
Scenario 6: Late vector-mediated GLRD infection (LV). In this scenario, 
GLRD is introduced through insect vectors in years 12, 16 or 20. It identifies a 
possible vineyard age beyond which no intervention would be recommended given a 
vineyard lifespan of 25 years. 
Economic analysis.  A NPV per hectare was calculated for each GLRD control 
scenario over the economic lifetime of vineyards (25 years). GLRD impacts were 
computed as the difference between the baseline NPV (i.e. no infection) and the NPV 
of the particular scenario considered. The NPV calculations are based on data (costs, 
revenues and financial assumptions) reported previously (White 2007), as described in 
table 1.3; on survey data (disease prevalence, impact on yield and price paid for the 
grapes) collected; and findings from the literature. Fixed costs were omitted from the 
analysis because they are identical for the different scenarios. Optimal control 
measures were identified as those with the highest NPV.  
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1.3 Results 
The economic impact of GLRD over the lifetime of a Cabernet franc vineyard in the 
Finger Lakes ranges from $25,407 per hectare (for a 30% yield reduction and no 
quality penalty) to $41,000 per hectare (for a 50% yield reduction and a 10% penalty 
for poor fruit quality) if no control measures are implemented (table 1.4).   
Value of planting vines derived from certified, virus-tested stocks. Results 
indicate that paying a price premium of 25% for clean plant material (i.e., 25% on top 
of the non-certified vine price of $3.25/vine, table 1.3) reduces GLRD-related losses to 
$1,829 per hectare. This loss is substantially smaller than those following roguing and 
vineyard replacement (table 1.5). It should be noted that this estimate does not take 
into account the possibility of a subsequent introduction of GLRD through vectors; 
Table 1.3 Cabernet franc production, cost, revenue and financial assumptions 
 Item Value and unit 
Production  Row spacing 2.7 m  
Vine spacing 1.8 m  
Planting density 1,994 vines/ha 
Vine replacement without GLRD 2%/year 
Cost Skilled labor wage $16.6/hr 
Unskilled labor wage $11.60/hr 
Gasoline $0.76/L  
Diesel $0.87/L  
Vines $3.25/vine 
Revenue Price $1,874/t  
Yield (years 4 and above) 7.4 t/ha  
Financial Discount rate 7.37% 
Project life cycle 25 years 
Source: White (2007) 
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instead it focuses on the value of using certified vines to prevent the introduction of 
GLRD at planting. 
 
Roguing or vineyard replacement. The NPVs for roguing at various levels of 
initial infection and vineyard replacement suggest the existence of a threshold level of 
disease prevalence beyond which the optimal GLRD control is to replace the vineyard 
(Tables 5 and 6). Roguing yields higher NPVs than vineyard replacement for 
prevalence levels of 25% and below; and vineyard replacement yields the highest 
NPV for prevalence levels above 25%. The infection threshold is consistent with the 
survey responses. For example, a respondent that reported a 40% GLRD prevalence 
decided to replace the vineyard, whereas others dealing with infection levels of 1 and 
5% practiced roguing. Under optimal GLRD control, the disease impact is reduced to 
Table 1.4 Net present value (NPV) of no GLRD control scenarios under different 
Cabernet franc yield reduction (30 and 50%) and quality penalty (0 and 10%) 
conditions 
Scenarios 
NPV
c 
 
($/ha) 
GLRD economic impact
d
 
($/ha) 
No control, no penalty, 30% yield 
reduction (NN30)
a
 $7, 690 
 
$25,407 
No control, 10% penalty, 30% yield 
reduction (N30)  $6,786 
 
$26,334 
No control, no penalty, 50% yield 
reduction (NN50) ($7119)
c 
 
$40,241 
No control, 10% penalty, 50% yield 
reduction (N50) ($7,900)  
 
$41,019 
Replacement
b
 
$8,468 
 
$24,651 
a See description of scenarios in table 1.1 
b Replacement: replacing vineyard at onset of symptoms in year 4  
c Numbers in parenthesis represent losses 
d Computed as the difference between the NPV of roguing and the baseline NPV 
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a range of $3,208 to $24,654 per hectare for scenarios of roguing at 1% GLRD 
prevalence and vineyard replacement, respectively (table 1.5).  
 
Table 1.6 GLRD control decision matrix in a Cabernet franc vineyard based on 
yield reduction, GLRD prevalence and a quality penalty 
Yield reduction level Penalty level 
30% yield reduction 10% penalty None 
≤ 25% infection roguea rogue 
> 25% infection replace vineyard indifferent 
Less than 30% yield reduction   
≤ 25% infection rogue rogue 
> 25% infection replace vineyard do not control 
50% yield reduction   
≤ 25% infection rogue rogue 
> 25% infection replace vineyard replace vineyard 
aRecommendations in decision matrix are based on results from Tables 4 and 5.  
Table 1.5 Economic impact of GLRD in a Cabernet franc vineyard under vine 
roguing, vineyard replacement, and planting virus-tested vines 
Disease control scenarios
a
 NPV ($/ha) GLRD economic impact
b
 ($/ha) 
Baseline scenario (B) $33,122  $0 
Establishing vineyard with 
certified, virus-tested vines (C) $31,291  $1,829  
Roguing scenarios (T1-60)   
    1 $29,915  $3,207  
5 $26,084  $7,038  
10 $22,351 $10,771  
20 $14,275  $18,847  
25 $9,815  $23,307  
26 $8,115 $25,007  
30 $5,261 $27,861  
40 $2,000  $35,121  
50 ($9,244)
c
 $42,366  
60 ($22,914) $56,036  
Vineyard replacement (R) $8,468 $24,654  
a See table 1.1 for scenario description 
b The GLRD impact is computed as the difference between the NPV of roguing and the baseline NPV 
c Numbers in parenthesis represent losses 
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Late vector-mediated GLRD infection. Roguing has a positive impact on NPV 
even when infection occurs at a later stage. Roguing reduces losses by $9,271 and 
$11,733 per hectare in years 12 and 16, respectively (table 1.7). However, roguing 
increases losses in year 19 and after, suggesting the existence of a threshold vineyard 
age beyond which roguing is not optimal. This puts an upper bound on the age of the 
vineyard under which roguing remains economical; investing in planting new vines 
five years before the end of the lifecycle is not justified.  
 
No control.  Roguing is optimal for disease management with a 50% yield 
reduction because the ‘no control’ scenario yields negative NPVs (table 1.4, rows 
NN50 and N50). However, ‘no control’ was the most economically feasible response 
in certain instances. For example, for a 30% yield reduction and no penalty for poor 
fruit quality, the NPV (table 1.4, row NN30) equals the NPV of vineyard replacement 
(table 1.5). This result suggests that ‘no control’ is the optimal response when the level 
Table 1.7 NPV of scenarios depicting late vector-mediated transmission 
occurring in a Cabernet franc vineyard in years 12, 16 or 20 with (TLV)
a
 and 
without roguing (NLV). 
Late vector-mediated infection scenarios 
NPV  
($/ha) 
Roguing impact
b 
($/ha) 
Year 12, no roguing (NLV 12) $23,502
 c
  
Year 12, roguing (TLV12) $32,774 $9,272 
Year 16, no roguing (NLV 16) $18,286  
Year 16, roguing (TLV16) $30,018 $11,733 
Year 20, no roguing (NLV 20) $31,118  
Year 20, roguing (TLV20) $30,270 ($848)
d
 
aSee table 1.1 for scenario description  
bThe impact of roguing is computed as the difference between the NPV of roguing and the NPV of ‘no roguing’ 
cThe NPVs are computed using infection levels from Table 2, column N 
d Number in parenthesis represent losses 
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of infection is above 25% (i.e. for the range where vineyard replacement is optimal), 
yield reduction is less than 30% and there is no quality penalty. The optimality of ‘no 
control’ in this case does not internalize the damages that could be caused by disease 
transmission to neighboring vineyards through insect vectors. In situations where there 
is evidence of such a transmission, replacing vineyard blocks with infection levels 
above 25% would be advisable to prevent secondary infections.  
Changes in grape prices below and above the baseline price of $1,700/t did not 
lead to changes in the recommendation of roguing when GLRD prevalence is 25% and 
below and replacing the vineyard otherwise (table 1.8).  
 
 
1.4 Discussion 
The economic impact of GLRD on grafted V. vinifera cv. Cabernet franc in New York 
(approximately $25,000-$40,000 per hectare) is consistent with losses reported by 
Table 1.8 Sensitivity analysis with respect to the price of Cabernet franc grapes: the 
recommendation of replacing the vineyard beyond 25% GLRD prevalence is 
unchanged 
 NPV ($/ha) 
Disease control p=$1,764/t  p=$1874/t  p=$1984.5/t  
Roguing at 20% 
GLRD (T20) $7,816  $14,275  $20,732  
Roguing at 25% 
GLRD (T25) $3,506  $9,815  $16,124  
Roguing at 26% 
GLRD (T26) $1,307  $8,115  $13,779  
Roguing at 30% 
GLRD (T30) ($813)
a
 $5,261  $11,332  
Replacing 
vineyard (R) $2,439  $8,468  $14,498  
aNumber in parenthesis represent losses 
p = price
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Walker et al. (2004) (approximately $33,000-$50,000 per hectare by year 20 for three 
scenarios of infection risk) and Nimmo-Bell (2006) (approximately $47,000 per 
hectare) on V. vinifera cvs. Sauvignon blanc and Merlot in New Zealand. Sourcing 
clean, virus-tested vines reduces the economic impact of GLRD to a value that is 
below any of the NPVs of disease control (table 1.5). This finding suggests that 
vineyard managers should select virus-tested vines in order to maximize profits. 
Paying a premium of 25% on planting material derived from certified stocks is 
financially rewarding although it may not be attractive at first glance.  
The estimated GLRD impact is particularly alarming for the Finger Lakes wine 
industry given the high prevalence of viruses associated with GLRD ( Fuchs et al. 
2009a, Martinson et al., 2008) and the documented presence of viruliferous insect 
vectors and their possible role in within-vineyard transmission (Fuchs 2008, Fuchs et 
al. 2009b). For example, 69% of the Cabernet franc vineyards surveyed in 2006 in the 
Finger Lakes was GLRD-affected (Martinson et al 2008). Applying this proportion to 
the Cabernet franc vineyards in the region (approximately 55 ha) results in 38 ha of 
infected vineyards. Based on NPVs (table 1.4), economic losses for that cultivar range 
from $1 to $1.5 million if the disease is not controlled. Evidence of high GLRD 
prevalence and presence of GLRaV vectors in the region is relatively recent. This 
might explain why some vineyard managers have underestimated GLRD-related 
losses. This study, along with the recent evidence of high GLRD prevalence, provides 
disease impact information that vineyard managers need to take into account to 
implement loss-minimizing disease control measures.   
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Although this study sheds light on the economic impact of GLRD, the results 
should be interpreted with caution. For example, disease spread patterns used in the 
study are from Charles et al. (2009) because no experimental data are available yet 
from the Finger Lakes. Given the low prevalence of mealybugs in the region (Fuchs et 
al. 2009a), the model could have overestimated the GLRD impact under the no control 
scenario. Future research should survey GLRD and vector prevalence over time to 
develop models of GLRD spread that can be used to estimate impact with more 
accuracy.  
Earlier studies recommend controlling GLRD through roguing of symptomatic 
vines and their replacement with healthy ones (Freeborough and Burger 2006, 
Nimmo-Bell 2006, Walker et al. 2004). This study contributes to this literature by 
showing that roguing requires a large enough reduction in yield and/or enforcement of 
a price penalty on lower quality grapes to be economically justified. The 10% penalty 
rate reported in the survey may be too low and could underestimate the GLRD impact 
on wine quality. For example, Walker et al. (2004) assumed that grapes from infected 
vines lost 75% of their value. This is considerably higher than the penalty reported in 
the Finger Lakes (10% according to the survey) and might suggest that wineries 
underestimate the impact of GLRD on wine quality. Martinson et al. (2008) found that 
soluble solids were 2 Brix lower in grapes from GLRD-affected vines than from 
healthy vines. Those grapes also had higher juice pH and lower titratable acidity. 
Further sensory analysis studies are needed to link changes in Brix and acidity to 
changes in wine attributes and establish quality threshold levels for the of sugar and 
acidity contents. Then, using wine hedonic price models, a quality penalty could be 
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formulated in terms of ranges of sugar and acidity levels. Wineries would 
subsequently prevent a GLRD-related decrease in wine quality either by rejecting 
grapes that do not meet those thresholds or by imposing a quality penalty on those 
grapes and using them to produce bulk wines. This penalty can act as a price incentive 
for vineyard managers to control GLRD and prevent a loss in the market value of their 
grapes.  
Over thirty wine grape cultivars are grown in the Finger Lakes. Although the 
analysis focuses on Cabernet franc, the results can be extended to other cultivars that 
are affected by GLRD in the region such as Cabernet Sauvignon, Chardonnay, 
Lemberger, Merlot, Pinot noir and Riesling (Fuchs et al. 2009a). Cabernet franc was 
particularly important to analyze for two reasons. First, GLRD symptoms are more 
visible in red than in white grape varieties (Martelli and Boudon-Padieu 2006) and 
roguing is therefore more easily implemented. Second, GLRD affects Cabernet franc 
more than other cultivars because it ripens later. This feature is crucial for cool-
climate viticulture regions such as the Finger Lakes because the short growing season 
and early frost precludes delaying harvest to compensate for delayed ripening in 
GLRD-affected vines – which may be an option in areas with a longer growing 
season.  In warmer climates and/or with early cultivars, it might be appropriate to 
replace the quality penalty component of the GLRD impact with a delayed harvest 
component and measure the economic losses associated with the delay, if any. GLRD 
impact on other cultivars would also be different due to differences in market prices; 
higher prices imply greater values of GLRD-related losses and vice-versa. 
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Among the available disease prevention and control methods, vector control 
was not included in the scenarios of this study since the efficiency of insecticides at 
reducing GLRD spread is still under study (Daane et al. 2008, Golino and Almeida 
2008).    
 
1.5 Conclusion 
This research provides Finger Lakes vineyard managers with estimates of the 
economic impact of GLRD on the profitability of their businesses. It is estimated to 
range from $25,000 to $40,000 per hectare for scenarios of yield reduction and quality 
penalty over twenty-five years if left uncontrolled. The results suggest that, in order to 
minimize potential losses due to GLRD, managers ought to prevent infection by 
selecting certified, virus-tested vines for replant sites and by controlling the disease 
according to the decision matrix recommendations of this study. That is, disease 
control should be based on the values of infection level, yield reduction, price penalty 
incurred, and age of the vineyard.  Future research should survey the prevalence of 
GLRD and its vectors over time to develop models that capture the disease dynamics 
in the Finger Lakes.  Translating our results to other grape-growing regions with 
GLRD will require adjusting for differences in economic and epidemiological 
parameters that are unique to each region. However, independently of the region, we 
predict that roguing will remain the best control response up to a certain level of 
disease prevalence beyond which vineyard replacement will yield a higher net present 
value, and no disease control will be economically justified for certain parameter 
values.
23 
CHAPTER 2 
 
A PLANT-LEVEL, SPATIAL, BIOECONOMIC MODEL OF PLANT DISEASE 
DIFFUSION AND CONTROL: GRAPEVINE LEAFROLL DISEASE 
 
Most GLRD research has focused on studying the pathogens with less emphasis on 
disease ecology and disease management (Almeida et al. 2013). This paper employs 
information available in the GLRD disease ecology literature to develop a 
computational, spatial bioeconomic model that can be used to identify profit-
maximizing strategies for GLRD control. Using cellular automata, we model the 
disease at the plant level, in a spatial-dynamic way. In the simulations, the disease is 
introduced to an artificial vineyard through infected plant material at the time of 
planting. Subsequently, its diffusion follows a Markov process that is affected by each 
vine’s location, virus detectability, age, own infection state, and infection states of its 
neighbors. We then use a vineyard manager’s profit maximization objective function 
to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of disease control strategies formulated based on 
these vine-level characteristics. Our model contributes to the literature that employs 
nonspatial, compartmental models when modeling diseases by relaxing the 
simplifying assumptions that individuals are homogenous in their attributes and 
spatially perfectly-mixed.
 1
  
 We examine the impact of alternative disease control strategies on 
distributions of bioeconomic outcomes and rank them based on the vineyard expected 
net present values (ENPVs). The results highlight the potential of vine-level, spatial 
                                                 
1
 The perfect-mixing assumption implies that any infective individual can transmit the infection to any 
healthy individual with equal probability (Brauer and Castillo-Chavez 2001). 
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strategies in reducing the economic cost of GLRD. In addition, our model can be 
modified to address spatial-dynamic disease diffusion and control issues in other 
perennial crops. We are not aware of previous work in agricultural and resource 
economics that formulates a spatial, plant-level, model of plant disease diffusion and 
control. 
 
2.1 Literature Review   
The unique characteristics of certain insect-transmitted plant diseases restrict the 
choice of approaches to model disease diffusion and control. The first characteristic of 
such diseases is that they are simultaneously driven by integrated dynamic and spatial 
forces, rather than by dynamic processes alone. When diseased plants are 
heterogeneously distributed in space and the physical environment includes spatial 
constraints on disease diffusion, such as a vineyard’s spatial configuration, the 
optimality of disease control is affected not only by its intensity but also by its 
location.  
 Secondly, in insect-transmitted plant diseases, pesticide applications can be 
ineffective. This is particularly true in the case of GLRD where insect vectors can 
have a short infectivity retention period,
2
 live in crevices and underneath the bark of 
the grapevine (Cabaleiro and Segura 2006, 2007; Daane et al. 2012), and can spread 
disease rapidly even if their population is kept at a low density (Charles et. al 2009; 
Tsai et al. 2008; Walton and Pringle 1999). Instead, insect-transmitted disease control 
relies mostly on reducing the source of infection by roguing (removing) infected 
                                                 
2
 The insect infectivity period is the time in which insect vectors retain the virus and remain infective 
(Tsai et al. 2008). 
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plants and replacing them with young, healthy ones (Chan and Jeger 1994). Thus, 
despite the attractive features of pest control models such as the ability to account for 
product quality in estimating pest control effectiveness (Babcock, Lichtenberg, and 
Zilberman 1992) or incorporating pest randomness in pesticide application decision 
rules (Saphores 2000), these models are not appropriate for vector-transmitted plant 
diseases such as GLRD.  
Plant heterogeneity is the third characteristic of certain diseases. In the case of 
GLRD, individual vines that are infected but nonsymptomatic are heterogeneous in the 
time it takes for their virus population to be detectable by virus tests (Cabaleiro and 
Segura 2007; Constable et al. 2012). For some of these vines, the virus may not be 
detected and rogued before they transmit the disease to neighboring vines, causing 
disease control to lag behind disease diffusion and impeding eradication. Taken 
together, these three characteristics call for plant-level, spatial-dynamic models of 
disease diffusion and control. 
2.1.1 Spatial Bioeconomic Models 
Spatial-dynamic processes have only recently been studied by economists and the 
bioeconomic literature on agricultural diseases and invasive species control is mostly 
nonspatial (see review in Wilen 2007). Sanchirico and Wilen (1999, 2005) show that 
ignoring spatial processes can lead to suboptimal managerial decisions. Space can be 
incorporated in bioeconomic disease models by introducing barriers to disease 
diffusion (e.g., Brown, Lynch, and Zilberman 2002), specifying location-dependent, 
state-transition probabilities (e.g., Rich and Winter-Nelson 2007), or by using partial 
differential equations (e.g., Holmes et al. 1994). In such models, spatial heterogeneity 
26 
is exogenous and fixed over time (see review in Smith, Sanchirico and Wilen 2009). 
In some diseases including GLRD, however, spatial heterogeneity such as the health 
status of a plant’s neighborhood can be endogenously determined by the diffusion 
process, affect disease diffusion and be affected by the implementation of control 
strategies. The challenge of incorporating such spatial feedbacks into state dynamics is 
a common thread in resource economics and not confined to disease dynamic models 
(Smith, Sanchirico and Wilen 2009). Moreover, spatial bioeconomic models often 
make restrictive assumptions such as linear growth and control to achieve tractability 
or to focus on steady state analyses in simple landscapes (see review in Epanchin-Niell 
and Wilen 2012). Relaxing such assumptions precludes analytical solutions and calls 
for numerical methods in most applications (Smith, Sanchirico and Wilen 2005; Wilen 
2007).  
2.1.2 Bioeconomic Models of Agricultural Diseases 
Research on the economics of agricultural disease control has increasingly moved 
towards integrated epidemiological models that incorporate feedbacks between 
economic and disease diffusion components within the model (Beach et al. 2007; 
Fenichel and Horan 2007; Horan and Wolf 2005). These models typically aggregate 
individuals into disease-state (e.g. Horan et al. 2010) or age-state (e.g. Tahvonen 
2009) compartments (they are thus called compartmental models), and employ 
differential or difference equations (DEs) to represent transitions between states. They 
assume that the population is spatially perfectly-mixed, and that the individuals are 
homogenous in their attributes within each compartment.   
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These assumptions are limiting in disease modeling, especially in the case of 
GLRD where (1) plants are heterogeneous in virus detectability, and (2) disease 
diffusion follows imperfect mixing processes and is shaped by vineyard spatial 
configuration and location of vines (Constable et al. 2012; Pietersen 2006). The 
homogeneity assumption of aggregate models is particularly restrictive because it 
precludes the formulation and testing of disease control strategies targeting individuals 
based on their heterogeneous, spatial-dynamic attributes. Also, the perfect-mixing 
assumption has been shown to underestimate the rate of spread in the early stages of a 
disease and to overestimate it in the later stages (Cane and McNamee 1982). These 
assumptions can be relaxed in DE models to represent distinct groups where 
individuals are heterogeneous by increasing the number of subpopulations or dividing 
the subpopulations into smaller stocks (e.g. Medlock and Galvani 2009). Depending 
on the level of heterogeneity desired, however, this process can lead to a combinatorial 
explosion in the number of state variables, equations, parameters, and data 
requirements (Teose et al. 2011). Moreover, in aggregate bioeconomic models of 
diseases, transmission rates are imposed on individuals exogenously depending on 
membership in a specific subpopulation. In reality, however, these rates are 
determined in a spatial-dynamic fashion as a result of the spatial-dynamic feedbacks 
between disease diffusion and disease control.  
2.1.3 Cellular Automata Models 
With dramatic decreases in computational costs, cellular automata and agent-based 
models have emerged as a preferred methodological framework to study complex 
systems (Miller and Page 2007) such as diseases. Cellular automata are dynamic 
28 
models that operate in discrete space and time on a uniform and regular lattice of cells. 
Each cell is in one of a finite number of states that get updated according to 
mathematical functions and algorithms that constitute state transition rules. At each 
time step, a cell computes its new state given its own old state and the old state of its 
neighborhood according to the transition rules (Tesfatsion 2006; Wolfram 1986). The 
spatial-dynamic structure is especially relevant when modeling processes that face 
physical constraints (Gilbert and Terna, 2000) such as boundaries and geometry as in 
the case of managed agricultural systems. In contrast with compartmental models, 
cellular automata and agent-based models do not aggregate individuals in 
compartments, thus allowing each individual to be heterogeneous in any finite number 
of attributes (Rahmandad and Sterman 2008). Although cellular automata models have 
been extensively employed to model spatial-dynamic processes (e.g. Sun et al. 2010; 
Yassemi, Dragićević, and Schmidt 2008), their use in the agricultural economics 
literature has been rare. The few examples include one application to the foot-and-
mouth disease control (Rich, Winter-Nelson, and Brozovic 2005) and land use change 
studies (Balmann 1997; Kay-Blake et al. 2009; Marshall and Homans 2001; Roth et al. 
2009).  
 We contribute to the disease control bioeconomic literature by employing 
cellular automata to offer a model that is inherently spatial and dynamic. We formally 
define the bioeconomic model, then build the computational model, verify its 
behavior, calibrate it and validate it using GLRD disease ecology literature field data. 
Using simulation experiments, we generate distributions of bioeconomic outcomes for 
the scenario of no disease, the strategy of no disease control and 18 alternative 
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nonspatial and spatial disease control strategies. We then conduct statistical analyses 
to rank the expected net present values generated in each experiment and find the 
optimal disease control strategy. Finally, we conduct sensitivity analyses to key 
bioeconomic model parameters. We synthesize our modeling process in table 2.1.  
 
2.2 Bioeconomic Model 
The spatial geometry of disease diffusion is represented by a two-dimensional grid  
representing a vineyard plot.  is the set of I x J cells where I and J are the number of 
rows and columns, respectively. In our model, there are 5,720 cells , each 
holding one grapevine. Vineyard rows are oriented north to south with I=44 vines per 
grid row and J=130 vines per grid column resulting in a vineyard area of 
approximately 5.2 acres.
3
 
                                                 
3
 This configuration is considered representative of a typical vineyard in the Northeastern United States 
(Wolf 2008).
 The represented vineyard dimensions are 350’ x 650’with an area of 227,500 ft2 or 5.22 
acres. Vine and column spacing are 5 and 8 feet, respectively.  
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Each cell  has an age state and an infection state. Time  progresses in 
discrete monthly steps up to 600 months.  is a 600 × 1 vector holding a 1 for a 
vine’s age in months and zeros for the other possible ages. A vine can be Infective or 
Noninfective. Infective (I) and Noninfective (NI) vines differ by whether or not they 
exhibit symptoms and have the ability to transmit the infection to their neighbors. 
Table 2.1 Overview of the Modeling Process  
 Modeling Step  Tool 
1. Formal model.  
 Define bioeconomic model. None. 
2. Computational model.  
2a. Model specification. 
 - Specify cellular automata model by defining: 
o Space and time 
o States and state transitions 
 - Define model parameters and variables. 
Java, 
AnyLogic. 
2b. Model verification.  
 - Conduct simulation and collect simulated data. 
- Debug to ensure consistency in model behavior between 
computational model and formal model. 
Java, 
AnyLogic. 
2c. Model calibration  
 Define optimization experiment that aims to find the optimal 
transmission parameter values using field data from the 
literature. 
OptQuest, 
AnyLogic. 
2d. Model validation  
 Validate calibrated model by testing that the expected time to 50% 
disease prevalence (expected half-life) and expected time to 100% 
disease prevalence measures fall within intervals reported in the 
literature.  
Java, 
AnyLogic. 
3.  Simulation experiments  
 Define and conduct Monte Carlo experiments: scenarios of ‘no 
disease’, ‘no disease control’, 8 nonspatial and 10 spatial disease 
control strategies.  
Java, 
AnyLogic. 
4. Statistical analyses  
 Conduct statistical tests on the differences between expected net 
present values. 
Stata. 
5. Sensitivity analyses  
 Repeat steps 3 and 4 for each parameter considered in the 
sensitivity analysis. 
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Noninfective vines, in turn, can be in the following infection states: Healthy (H), 
Exposed-undetectable (Eu), and Exposed-detectable (Ed). Subdividing the Noninfective 
states allows us to separate healthy vines from those that have been exposed to the 
virus and have therefore lower grape yield and quality. The distinction between the 
states Exposed-undetectable (Eu), and Exposed-detectable (Ed) is important to separate 
the vines whose virus populations have not reached detectable levels (Exposed-
undetectable), from those with virus populations high enough to be detectable through 
a virus test (Exposed-detectable). Infective vines, for their part, can exhibit two states, 
namely Infective-moderate (Im) or Infective-high (Ih). Separating the two states allows 
us to model the decrease in vine economic value as GLRD symptoms severity 
increases over time from the moderate to the high level. is the infection state 
vector at time  of dimension 5 × 1. The vector holds a 1 for the state that describes a 
vine’s infection state and zeros for the remaining four states. is an age-infection 
composite state defined as the combination of a vine’s age state  and its infection 
state . 
A vine’s infection and age states map into a third dynamic state variable, its 
economic value, or per-vine revenue . Per-vine revenue equals zero if the 
vine’s age  is below . Beyond that age,  is function of the vine 
infection state. Grapes from GLRD-affected vines are subject to a penalty imposed on 
the price paid for grapes harvested from healthy vines. Furthermore, GLRD reduces 
grapevine yield by 30%, 50%, and 75% for vines in states Exposed (both Exposed-
undetectable and Exposed-detectable), Infective-moderate, and Infective-high, 
respectively (table 2.2). A vine’s revenue is known to a vineyard manager at time .  
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Nevertheless, the per-vine revenue is random for periods beyond  as it depends on the 
vine’s infection state . 
Given each vine’s state , and an infection state transition matrix , its 
expected infection state at time is computed according to the 
following infection-state transition equation: 
 (1)    
where  is the expectation operator and  is the transpose of matrix .  is a 
5 x 1 vector with a probability of staying in the current state, a probability of 
transitioning to the next state, and zeros elsewhere.  
Disease diffusion is spatially constrained by the vineyard’s horizontal (equation 2a) 
and vertical boundaries (equation 2b) as follows: 
4
  
(2a) ;  
(2b)  
                                                 
4
 These spatial constraints are formulated by defining the set of indices that vine ’s within-column 
(equation 2a) and across-column neighbors (equation 2b) can have. They ensure that the disease does 
not spread beyond the vines situated at the borders of the vineyard. 
Table 2.2 Vine Revenue 
 
Age ( ) and infection ( ) states 
Yield 
reduction 
(%)
a
 
Quality 
penalty 
(%)
b
 
Vine revenue 
($/vine/month)
c
  
  
≤ 36 months n/a n/a 0.00 
≥ 48 months and  H 0 0 0.43 
≥ 48 months  and  Eu or Ed 30 10 0.27 
48 months and    Im 50 10 0.19 
≥ 48 months  and  Ih 75 10 0.09 
a Goheen and Cook (1959) and Martinson et al. (2008).    
b Atallah et al. 2012.   
c Vine revenue calculations are based on the Cabernet franc grape yield of 3.3 tons per acre, per year (White 
2008), a planting density of 1096 vines per acre (Wolf 2008), and a grape price of $1,700/ton (White 2008).  
n/a: not applicable (a vine is not productive below the age of 36 months).
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We now describe how the infection state transition probability matrix P 
governs disease diffusion. Vines in state Healthy (H) are susceptible to infection. They 
get exposed to the virus with a neighborhood-dependent probability b. At this point, 
they enter a latency period during which they are nonsymptomatic and noninfective. 
At first, the virus population in the vine is below levels that can be detected by virus 
tests and the vine is in state Exposed-undetectable (Eu). The virus population reaches 
detectable levels with probability c (i.e., the vine transitions to state Exposed-
detectable, Ed). The transition to state Infective-moderate (Im) happens with a 
probability  and marks the end of the latency period and the beginning of the 
infectivity period as well as the onset of visual symptoms. Symptoms, which consist 
of reddening and downward rolling of the leaves, are at moderate severity state first 
(Im), and transition to a state of high severity later, or Infective-high (Ih), with a 
probability . Mathematically, P can be expressed as follows:
5
  
(3) P =      
 In equation (3),  is the Healthy to Exposed-undetectable transition probability 
conditional on previous own, and neighborhood infection states. It can be expressed as 
                                                 
5
P reads from row (states H, Eu, Ed, Im, and Ih at time t) to column (states H, Eu, Ed, Im, and Ih at time 
t+1).   
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(4)
 
 
  In equation (4), is the infectivity state of a vine’s von Neumann 
neighborhood.
6
 For example, = (I, I, I, NI) is the state of a neighborhood 
composed of two Infective (I) neighbors in the same column (within-column 
neighbors), one Infective neighbor in the adjacent column (across-column neighbor) 
and one Noninfective (NI) neighbor in the other adjacent column (across-column 
neighbor). Given that each of the four neighbors can be in one of two infectivity states 
(I or NI),  can be in one of the 24 states listed in equation (4). Parameters α and β  
are the within-column and across-column transmission rates with , 
                                                 
6
 This type of neighborhood represents the most common vertical trellis system where a vine is in 
contact with its four neighbors in the cardinal directions. In contrast, a horizontal trellis system favors 
contact with up to eight neighbors (Cabaleiro and Segura 2006) and could be represented by a Moore 
neighborhood. 
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suggesting that Infective vines transmit the disease to their neighbors within the grid 
column at a higher rate than they transmit it to their neighbors situated in the adjacent 
grid column. We choose this neighborhood-based infection state transition to reflect 
patterns of GLRD diffusion observed in spatial analyses where the disease is shown to 
spread preferentially along grid columns (Habili et al. 1995; Le Maguet et al. 2013). 
We assume that within- and across-column infections occur independently with rate 
parameters and . That is, the time a vine stays in the Healthy state before 
transitioning to the Exposed-undetectable state, is a random variable, exponentially 
distributed, with rate  for within-column state transitions and rate  for across-
column state transitions. In each time step, a random variable  determines whether 
the Healthy to Exposed-undetectable state transition happens or not. A Healthy vine 
that has one within-column Infective neighbor (e.g., ) receives the 
infection at time t+1 if   , where  is a random draw from ~ (0, 1). 
Conversely, the disease is not transmitted if . Similarly, a Healthy vine 
that has one across-column Infective neighbor (e.g., ) receives the 
infection at time t+1 if   and is not transmitted if   . When 
two or more transmission types are realized- for example, when a vine has one 
Infective within-column neighbor and one Infective across-column neighbor- the 
disease transmission is determined by the shortest of the waiting times (Cox 1959).
7
 
 The probability of transition from Exposed-undetectable (Eu) to Exposed-
detectable (Ed) is given by  as follows: 
                                                 
7 We compare the random variable with the transition probability in each time step because the state of 
a vine’s neighborhood is changing over time, thus changing the probability that a vine receives the 
infection in each time interval. 
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(5)  
This transition happens after a vine has spent a period  in state Exposed-
undetectable. Cabaleiro and Segura (2007) and Constable et al. (2012) report 
minimum ( ), maximum ( ) and most common ( ) values for this period. With 
no further knowledge on the distribution of this period, we assume it is drawn from a 
triangular distribution with parameters  and . The probability that the 
transition happens in less than x time steps, or ), can then be written as a 
function of these parameters (Kotz and van Dorp 2004). 
The Exposed-detectable to Infective state transition probability is given by  as 
follows:       
(6)  
This probability depends on a vine’s age category. Younger vines have shorter latency 
periods (Pietersen 2006), i.e. Ly < Lm < Lo, where subscripts ,  and  denote young 
(0-5 years), mature (5-20 years) and old (>20 years) vines, respectively. The waiting 
time after a vine enters state Exposed-detectable (Ed) and before it transitions to state 
Infective moderate (Im) is a random variable, exponentially distributed with fixed rate 
parameter  for young vines, for mature vines, and for old vines. 
 Finally, once a vine is in state Infective moderate (Im), symptom severity 
increases over time and reaches a high level after a period Inf. That is, the waiting time 
until a vine transitions from Infective-moderate (Im) to Infective-high (Ih) is a random 
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variable, exponentially distributed with fixed rate parameter . Thus, the 
probability that a vine transitions from Im to Ih 
is .
8
 Symbols, definitions, values, 
and references for the model parameters are presented in table 2.3. 
The objective of a risk-neutral vineyard manager is to maximize the vineyard 
ENPV by choosing an optimal disease control strategy from a discrete set of spatial 
and nonspatial strategies, . Strategies are based on vines’ age-infection states. Each 
strategy translates into two binary decisions for each vine in cell  in each time 
step. The first vine-level decision a manager faces is whether to rogue a vine and 
replace it with a new, virus-free vine 
9
 (  if roguing and replanting takes 
place, 0 otherwise). The other decision is whether to test for the virus (  if 
virus testing takes place, 0 otherwise).  
The optimal strategy  is the sequence of vine-level control variables 
{ } that allocates disease control effort over space and time so as to yield 
the maximum ENPV improvement over the strategy of no disease control. Letting
 
 be 
the expectation operator over the random vine-level revenue ,  the discount 
factor 
10
 at time t (in months) where t {0, 1, 2,…, 600}, the objective of a vineyard 
manager is to maximize the expected net present value
 
(ENPV) as follows:  
 
                                                 
8 
Note that, we do not need to compare a random variable with the probabilities at each time interval for 
the Eu-to- Ed, Ed-to- Im, and Im-to-Ih transitions because the rates and waiting times in these transitions 
do not depend on the neighborhood state and are therefore fixed.    
9
 We assume that the vineyard manager follows industry recommendations and uses virus-tested vines 
when replacing an infected vine. We also assume that virus-tested vines are virus-free. 
10
  , where  is the discount rate.  
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Table 2.3 Model Parameters 
Parameter Description Value Unit   Sources 
α Within-column H to Eu 
transition rate.  
4.2
a
 month
 -1
 Calibration experiment 
based on Charles et al. 
(2009). β Across-column H to Eu 
transition rate.  
0.014
a
 month
 -1
 
     
Ly Latency period for 
young vines.  
24 months Age-specific latency 
periods based on Jooste, 
Pietersen, and Burger 
(2011). 
Lm Latency period for 
mature vines. 
48 months 
Lo Latency period for old 
vines. 
72 months 
     
 Minimum of 
undetectability period. 
4 months Cabaleiro and Segura 
(2007); Constable et al. 
(2012).  Maximum of 
undetectability period. 
18 months 
 Mode of virus 
undetectability period. 
12 months 
     
Inf Period spent in state Im 
before a vine 
transitions to state Ih. 
36 months M. Fuchs, personal 
communication, April 9, 
2012. 
     
τmax Period from planting 
until productivity. 
36 months White (2008). 
 Discount factor. 0.9959 month
 -1
 Assumed. Equivalent to 
an annual discount rate 
of 5%. 
     
 
Unit cost of vine 
roguing (removal) and 
replacement. 
7.25 $/vine Based on White (2008) 
and Atallah et al. 
(2012); 
 
Unit cost of vine virus 
testing. 
2.61 $/vine AC Diagnostics (2012) 
for the material cost 
based on 1,000 samples; 
Luminex (2010) for the 
labor time.
 
 
 
a 
Transition rates are constant for a particular location over the 50 year period of study. This excludes for 
instance situations where new insect vector species are introduced and contribute to an increase in 
transmission rates. 
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 (7)  
 
subject to the infection state transition equation (equation 1) and the spatial constraints 
to disease diffusion (equations 2a and 2b). Note that the objective function not only 
takes into account the total amount of control realized under each strategy but also the 
timing, intensity and location of that control. The first expression in the curly brackets 
of equation (7) represents the revenue of a vine in location  and in age-infection 
state  at time t. If a manager has decided to rogue and replant vine  in the last 
 periods, then  is equal to 1 and the revenue is pre-multiplied by zero for a 
period of  until the replant bears fruit, where , and 
.
11
 The second expression in the curly brackets represents the 
cost of roguing-and-replanting ( ), and the cost of testing ( ), pre-multiplied by 
their corresponding binary decision variables. 
2.2.1 Model Initialization  
At the beginning of a simulation, 2% of the grapevines (including those situated at the 
border of the vineyard) are randomly chosen from a uniform spatial distribution U (0, 
5720) to transition from the Healthy to the Exposed state. This reflects findings in 
GLRD studies indicating that primary infection sources are randomly spatially 
distributed (Cabaleiro et al. 2008), and that initial disease prevalence is typically 
between 1% and 5% (Atallah et al. 2012). Thereafter, GLRD spreads to uninfected 
vines. 
                                                 
11
 This condition says that roguing and replanting in cell  cannot occur more than once in  
periods. It implies that a replant is never rogued before it bears fruit. 
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2.2.2 Model calibration and parameterization 
In order to select the disease transmission parameter values (α and β in table 2.3), we 
first define a calibration objective function that minimizes the difference between the 
total number of infected vines over time obtained from our computational model 
(under no disease control), and the total number of infected vines over time from 
temporal disease progress data in Charles et al. (2009). Next, we use an optimization 
engine (OptQuest
 TM
) that varies the values of α and β in each of the Monte Carlo 
simulations according to an algorithm combining Tabu search,
12
 scatter search, integer 
programming and neural networks, to find the optimal parameter values (Step 2c. in 
table 2.1). We finally validate that the expected time until 50% disease prevalence 
(vineyard half-life) and expected time to 100% disease prevalence measures from the 
calibrated model fall within ranges of temporal disease diffusion curves reported in the 
GLRD literature (Cabaleiro and Segura 2006; Cabaleiro et al. 2008) (Step 2d., table 
2.1). For the other parameters, we choose values reported in the literature after 
consultation with GLRD experts (table 2.3).   
We choose a monthly time step because it gives the disease diffusion model a 
temporal resolution that is consistent with the magnitude of the disease diffusion 
parameters. With no information on diffusion seasonality, we do not model seasons 
and assume for simplicity that disease diffusion and control can take place in any 
month.
13
  
 
                                                 
12 Tabu search is a metaheuristic procedure for solving optimization problems, designed to guide other 
methods to avoid the trap of local optimality. 
13 
 Note that, although simplifying, this assumption is consistent with the fact that, in reality, both 
disease diffusion and disease control take place during the same months (the growing season). 
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2.3 Experimental Design  
We design and implement Monte Carlo experiments to evaluate nonspatial and spatial 
disease control strategies by comparing their bioeconomic outcomes to those resulting 
from a strategy of no disease control. Each experiment consists of a set of 1,000 
simulation runs, over 600 months, on a vineyard of 5,720 grapevines. Experiments 
differ in the disease control strategy they employ. Outcome realizations for a run 
within an experiment differ due to random spatial initialization and random spatial 
disease diffusion.  Data collected over simulation runs are the expected values of the 
bioeconomic outcomes under each strategy (Step 3, table 2.1). Finally, we conduct 
statistical tests to rank the disease control strategies and find the optimal strategy (Step 
4, table 2.1). The model is written in Java and simulated using the software 
AnyLogic
TM
 (XJ Technologies). Below, we describe the disease control strategies and 
the outcomes measured. 
2.3.1 Disease control strategies      
The discrete set of disease control strategies, , includes 18 spatial and nonspatial 
strategies, in addition to the strategy of no disease control. In the subset of nonspatial 
strategies, the vineyard manager decides whether to rogue and replace symptomatic 
vines based on their symptoms (Infective-moderate; Infective-high) with or without 
considering their age (Young: 0-5; Mature: 6-19; Old: 20 and above). There are eight 
nonspatial strategies (Strategy 1 to Strategy 8 in table 2.4).
 14 
In the subset of spatial 
strategies, the vineyard manager decides whether to rogue and replant vines as soon as 
                                                 
14
 We exclude the strategy of roguing and replacing Infective-high and Young (IhY) because this age-
infection combination cannot be reached; it takes a vine more than 5 years to transition to the Infective-
high state. 
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they develop symptoms (Infective-moderate), test their neighbors and rogue-and-
replace them if they test positive. Figure1 shows the four types of neighborhoods 
considered in disease control (panels a, b, c, and d). If a vine tests positive, it is 
removed in the same period. There are 10 spatial strategies (Strategy 9 to Strategy 18 
in table 2.4). The scenario of no disease provides a baseline to compute the expected 
disease economic cost under each candidate strategy.  
2.3.2 Bioeconomic outcomes measured and ranking of control strategies  
In order to find the optimal disease control, we employ the objective function 
(equation 7) to rank the vineyard net present values under the alternative strategies. In 
addition, we collect simulated data on the expected total disease control costs, the 
expected total number of grapevines rogued and replaced, the expected average 
vineyard age, and the expected half-life. The latter is defined as the expected time 
period to reach 50% disease prevalence. It is a measure of the ability of a control 
strategy to slow down disease diffusion.  
 
2.4 Results and Discussion 
Overall, we find that spatial strategies are superior to nonspatial strategies. In fact, 
none of the nonspatial strategies improve the expected net present value over the 
strategy of no disease control, under the base model parameter values. We also find 
that age-structured disease control improves a vineyard ENPV compared to nonage-
structured control. However, such improvements are not present with spatial 
strategies. Among nonspatial strategies, targeting young, moderately infected vines 
(Strategy ImY) yields the highest vineyard ENPV. The spatial strategy of targeting 
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symptomatic vines and their four immediate neighbors (Strategy ImNSEW) is optimal, 
maximizing the vineyard ENPV.  
Figure 1.  Types of grapevine neighborhood 
 
 
 i-1,j  
i,j-1 i, j i, j+1 
 i+1, j  
 i-1,j  
 i, j  
 i+1, j  
 
Fig. 1a  Vines targeted under Strategy 
ImNSEW (vine (i, j)’s von-Neumann 
neighborhood) 
Fig. 1b Vines targeted under Strategy 
ImNS  
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Fig. 1c  Vines targeted under strategy 
ImNS2EW 
Fig. 1d  Vines targeted under strategy 
ImNS2EW2 
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Table 2.4 Disease Control Strategies: definitions and acronyms 
Disease Control Strategies Acronyms 
Nonspatial strategiesa. 
  1 Roguing and replacing all vines that are Infective. I 
  2 Roguing and replacing all vines that are Infective-moderate. Im 
  3 Roguing and replacing all vines that are Infective-high. Ih 
  4 Roguing and replacing vines that are Infective-moderate and Young. ImY 
  5 Roguing and replacing vines that are Infective-moderate and Mature. ImM 
  6 Roguing and replacing vines that are Infective-moderate and Old. ImO 
  7 Roguing and replacing vines that are Infective-high and Mature. IhM 
  8 Roguing and replacing vines that are Infective-high and Old. IhO 
 
Spatial strategiesb. 
  9  Roguing and replacing Infective-moderate vines in addition to testing 
their two within-column neighbors then roguing and replacing those that 
test positive. 
ImNS 
10  Roguing and replacing Infective-moderate vines in addition to testing 
their two across-column neighbors and two-within column neighbors then 
roguing and replacing those that test positive. 
ImNSEW 
11  Roguing and replacing Infective-moderate vines in addition to testing 
their four within-column neighbors and two across-column neighbors then 
roguing and replacing those that test positive. 
ImNS2EW 
12  Roguing and replacing Infective-moderate vines in addition to testing 
their four within-column and four within-row neighbors then roguing and 
replacing those that test positive. 
ImNS2EW2 
13
. 
Roguing and replacing Young, Infective-moderate vines in addition to 
testing their two within-column neighbors then roguing and replacing 
those that test positive. 
ImY-NS 
14
. 
Roguing and replacing Mature, Infective-moderate vines in addition to 
testing their two within-column neighbors then roguing and replacing 
those that test positive. 
ImM-NS 
15
. 
Roguing and replacing Old, Infective-moderate vines in addition to testing 
their two within-column neighbors then roguing and replacing those that 
test positive. 
ImO-NS 
16
. 
Roguing and replacing Young, Infective-moderate vines in addition to 
testing their two across-column neighbors and two-within column 
neighbors then roguing and replacing those that test positive. 
ImY-NSEW 
17
. 
Roguing and replacing Mature, Infective-moderate vines in addition to 
testing their two across-column neighbors and two-within column 
neighbors then roguing and testing those that test positive. 
ImM-NSEW 
18
. 
Roguing and replacing Old, Infective-moderate vines in addition to testing 
their two across-column neighbors and two-within column neighbors then 
roguing and replacing those that test positive. 
ImO-NSEW 
 
a 
Note that strategies 4 to 8 are the age-structured counterparts of strategies 2 and 3. 
b 
Note that strategies 13 to 18 are the age-structured counterparts of strategies 9 and 10.
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2.4.1 Nonspatial strategies 
Our simulations indicate that the vineyard’s ENPVs over a 50-year period are higher 
when nonspatial disease control strategies are structured by age (ImY, ImM, ImO, IhM, 
IhO) compared to the strategies that are not (Im, Ih, I) (table 2.5). Structuring strategies 
by vine age increases revenues by reducing the number of unproductive replants and 
disease control costs compared to nonage-structured strategies. The strategy of 
targeting young, moderately infected vines (Strategy ImY) yields the highest expected 
net present value. This result is significant because a vineyard manager might be 
inclined to wait until a productive vine is more severely infected and older before 
roguing and replacing it. Doing so, however, causes roguing and replanting to occur 
too late and less frequently thus reducing the vineyard ENPV.  
Under the base model parameter values, none of the nonspatial strategies yield 
a positive ENPV improvement over the strategy of no disease control. This finding 
suggests that current industry recommendations for roguing and replanting all 
symptomatic vines might not be ENPV-improving if the within-column disease 
transmission is high enough. Our result depends critically on the baseline value of the 
within-column transmission parameter α. We decrease this value to find a threshold 
that renders the best nonspatial Strategy ImY (targeting young, moderately infected 
vines) ENPV-improving. We find that, when α equals 1.169, Strategy ImY yields an 
ENPV that is 3% higher than of the ENPV of no disease control. This improvement is 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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Table 2.5 Disease Control Strategies: Expected Net Present Value Improvements 
    Expected Net Present Values a 
Disease Control Strategies Acronyms Value Disease 
Cost b 
Improvement 
over ‘no disease 
control’ c 
    $1,000  $1,000 $1,000 % 
 No disease  463 (0)d n/a n/a n/a 
 No disease control   316 (4) 147 n/a n/a 
Nonspatial strategies     
  1 All Infective I -147 (16) 610 -463
***
 -147 
  2 Infective-moderate Im -146 (16) 609 -462
*** -146 
  3 Infective-high Ih 284 (4) 179   -32
***
 -10 
  4 Infective-moderate and Young ImY 314 (3) 148      -1
***   0 
  5 Infective-moderate and Mature ImM 309 (4) 154      -7
***  -2 
  6 Infective-moderate and Old ImO 308 (4) 155      -8
***  -2 
  7 Infective-high and Mature IhM 295 (4) 168     -21
***  -7 
  8 Infective-high and Old IhO 310 (4) 153       -6
***  -2 
Spatial strategies     
  9  Two within-column neighbors of 
Infective-moderate vines. 
ImNS 374 (6) 89       58
*** 18 
10  Two within- and two across-column 
neighbors of Infective-moderate 
vines. 
ImNSEW 374 (5) 88       59
*** 19 
11  Four within- and two across-column 
neighbors   of Infective-moderate 
vines. 
ImNS2EW 309 (4) 154       -7
***  -2 
12  Four within- and four across-
column neighbors of   Infective-
moderate vines. 
ImNS2EW2 295 (5) 168    -21 
***  -7 
13
. 
Two within-column neighbors of 
Young, Infective-moderate vines.  
ImY-NS 215 (5) 248  -101 
*** -32 
14
. 
Two within-column neighbors of 
Mature, Infective-moderate vines. 
ImM-NS 316 (5) 147     0.1
***   0 
15
. 
Two within-column neighbors of 
Old, Infective-moderate vines. 
ImO-NS 303 (4) 159     -13
*** -4 
16
. 
Two within- and two across-column 
neighbors of   Young, Infective-
moderate vines. 
ImY-NSEW -59 (14) 521   -374
*** -119 
17
. 
Two within- and two across-column 
neighbors of Mature, Infective-
moderate vines. 
ImM-NSEW 317 (4) 146    1
***   0 
18
. 
Two within- and two across-column 
neighbors of Old, Infective-
moderate vines. 
ImO-NSEW 302 (4) 161    -14
***  -4 
 
n/a is not applicable. 
a 
Expectations are
 
obtained from 1,000 simulations for the 5-acre vineyard. 
b 
Expected
 Disease Cost = ENPV (‘No disease’)-  ENPV (Strategy). 
c
 ENPV improvement = ENPV (Strategy) - ENPV (‘No disease control’).  
d
 Standard deviations in parentheses.  
*** 
Difference is significant at the 1% level. 
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2.4.2 Spatial Strategies   
Among the nonage-structured spatial strategies (Strategies 9 through 12), the one that 
targets symptomatic vines and their four immediate neighbors (Strategy ImNSEW) 
yields the highest ENPV improvement over the strategy of no disease control ($59,000 
or 19%, table 2.5). This improvement is statistically significant at the 1% level. This 
strategy reduces the vineyard-level disease cost to $88,000 over 50 years, which is 
smaller than the cost of $147,000 when the disease is not controlled and the cost of 
$148,000 when the best nonspatial strategy is employed (Strategy ImY). The second-
best strategy is ImNS, which targets symptomatic vines and their two immediate 
neighbors. This strategy yields an ENPV improvement of $58,000 and reduces the 
disease cost to $89,000. This improvement is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
These results underscore the benefits of spatial disease control strategies in 
comparison with nonspatial strategies. Spatial strategies ImNS and ImNSEW increase 
the vineyard ENPV through early detection and control of nonsymptomatic grapevines 
situated in the neighborhood of a symptomatic grapevine. Consequently, the Infected-
high state is never reached and the highest yield reduction (75%, table 2.2, Ih) is never 
realized. At the terminal period, disease prevalence is 13% and 4% under Strategy 
ImNS and Strategy ImNSEW, respectively.  
The disease economic cost under the optimal Strategy ImNSEW is 
approximately $25,000 per hectare by year 25, and contrasts with previous GLRD 
estimates of approximately $8,000 per hectare over 20 years (Nimmo-Bell, 2006) and 
$7,000 per hectare over 25 years (Atallah et al. 2012). These studies assume that a 
strategy consisting of roguing and replanting all symptomatic vines is capable of 
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reducing the disease to a prevalence of 1% (Atallah et al. 2012) or eradicating it 
(Nimmo-Bell, 2006). Such assumptions are valid if all infected vines are symptomatic 
and can therefore be rogued and replaced. If we set the undetectability and latency 
periods to zero to replicate such an assumption, the expected disease economic costs 
are approximately $4,000 per hectare over 25 years when all symptomatic vines are 
rogued and replaced (Strategy I).  
We find that expanding the search for Exposed vines beyond the immediate 
neighbors leads to higher disease control costs and is not economical. For instance, 
Strategy ImNS2EW worsens the ENPV improvement relative to the strategy of no 
disease control (table 2.5). The estimated ENPVs become even more negative if 
disease search includes two additional across-column neighbors (Strategy ImNS2EW2, 
table 2.5). Interestingly, strategies featuring a search for Exposed vines beyond 
immediate neighbors (Strategy ImNS2EW and Strategy ImNS2EW2) yield lower 
expected half-life measures (i.e., they speed rather than delay disease diffusion) 
compared to the strategies testing only immediate neighbors (Strategy ImNS and 
Strategy ImNSEW).
 
Although the identification of a larger amount of infected, 
nonsymptomatic vines (Exposed) and their removal before they become Infective 
slows disease diffusion, beyond a certain level of roguing and replanting, the effect is 
reversed. Grapevine roguing and replanting implies replacing infected grapevines with 
younger healthy ones that have shorter latency periods. Once replants get infected, 
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they become infective in a relatively short period, and contribute to further disease 
diffusion.
 15
   
Among age-structured spatial strategies (Strategies 13 through 18), only those 
targeting mature vines (Strategy ImM-NS and Strategy ImM-NSEW) yield positive 
ENPV improvements over the strategy of no disease control (table 2.5). Note that age-
structured spatial control strategies (Strategies 13 through 18) perform worse than 
their nonage-structured (Strategies 9 and 10) counterparts. In contrast with nonspatial 
scenarios, structuring strategies by age in spatial scenarios reduces total revenues 
relative to nonage-structured strategies. This relative decrease in revenues is caused by 
the disease diffusion generated by those Exposed vines left undetected because they do 
not neighbor Infective-moderate vines in the targeted age category. Note that the 
channels through which structuring strategies by age affects the revenues are different 
in nonspatial and spatial strategies. In the nonspatial scenarios, revenue increases stem 
from reductions in the number of unproductive replants. In spatial scenarios, 
structuring disease control by age decreases revenues by lowering the level of early 
detection. 
2.4.3 Disease management insights 
Our results offer new insights to vineyard managers. Alternative disease control 
strategies yield different results through their different allocation of disease control 
effort allocation over time and space. A manager deciding when and where to control 
                                                 
15
 For example, we find that the final number of vines rogued and replanted under Strategy ImNS2EW is 
almost twice as under Strategy ImNS. Consequently, the vineyard age under Strategy ImNS2EW is 3 to 7 
years lower than under Strategy ImNS (by the 25
th
 and 50
th
 year, respectively). As a result, the expected 
vineyard half-life is 1,639 months (approximately 137 years) under Strategy ImNS2EW, compared with 
2,533 months (approximately 211 years) under Strategy ImNS. 
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GLRD (i.e., what age, infection, and location states to target) faces tradeoffs between 
the ecological benefits and drawbacks of controlling earlier, more frequently, and in a 
more extended neighborhood. Two types of costs incentivize vineyard managers to 
postpone roguing depending on their discount rates. One is the expenses incurred in 
testing, roguing and replacing vines, and the other is the opportunity cost of roguing 
an infected but still-productive vine. The latter cost consists of the forgone revenues 
during the period replants are unproductive. Postponing those costs has to be balanced 
with two types of ensuing damages, namely the continued reduction in revenues of 
uncontrolled infected vines and the expected economic losses due to infected vines 
spreading the infection to healthy ones. Our results show that it is beneficial to incur 
the costs of disease control earlier to avoid future damages and realize the benefits of a 
healthy, productive vineyard. That is, for nonspatial strategies, it is better to target 
younger vines in their earlier infection stages. For spatial strategies, testing the 
neighborhood of all symptomatic vines reduces uncertainty through early detection 
and control. Finally, our analysis shows that incurring virus testing costs is justified 
for strategies testing the immediate neighbors of symptomatic vines (Strategy ImNSEW 
and Strategy ImNS). 
 
2.5 Sensitivity Analyses 
We use the ENPVs from the simulations with alternative parameter values, together 
with the ENPVs calculated using the baseline parameters, to guide GLRD research 
investments by plant scientists, plant pathologists, and entomologists. Our sensitivity 
analyses deal with two critical questions. First, what parameter values make 
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eradication possible and optimal? Second, what is the threshold expenditure for a 
virus-test cost beyond which the optimal spatial strategy becomes cost-ineffective?  
2.5.1 Eradication feasibility and optimality 
We first focus on finding parameter values that make eradication possible and optimal. 
We find that Strategy ImNS and Strategy ImNSEW achieve eradication with 99% and 
100% probability, respectively, when the minimum ( ), maximum ( ), and mode 
( ) of the undetectability period PDF are substantially reduced. We simulate 
reductions from 4, 18, and 12 months in the baseline model (values in Cabaleiro and 
Segura 2007; Constable et al. 2012; Tsai et al. 2008) to approximately 1, 4, and 2 
months, respectively (figure 2, panel a). Eradication is achieved under optimal 
Strategy ImNSEW at these threshold parameter values, yielding an ENPV improvement 
of $139,100 (the difference between $455,100 and $316,000 in figure 2, panel a) over 
the strategy of no disease control. The ENPV improvement is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. The reduction in the undetectability period parameters might be 
achieved through new technology able to detect the virus one month after infection. 
Using the ENPVs in figure 2, we estimate the value of such technology at $81,000, 
under optimal Strategy ImNSEW (the difference between $455,000 and $374,000 in 
figure 2, panel a).
16
  
                                                 
16 Recall that our unit of analysis is a 5.2 acre vineyard with 5,720 vines. 
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(a) 
(b)  
 
 
(c) 
 
 
Figure 2. Sensitivity of Expected Net Present Values (ENPVs) to the Virus Undetectability 
Period (a), Within-Column Transmission (b), and Initial Infection Level (c) Parameters. 
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Eradication is also possible and optimal under Strategy ImNS with a probability 
of 97% if the within-column transmission rate (α) is reduced from 4.2 to 0.1. At this 
threshold rate, Strategy ImNS yields an ENPV improvement of $119,000 over the 
strategy of no disease control (the difference between $456,000 and $337,000 in figure 
2, panel b). This ENPV improvement is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Reducing the within-column transmission rate to 0.1 per month has a value of $82,000 
under optimal Strategy ImNS (the difference between $456,000 and $374,000 in figure 
2, panel b). Reduction in within-column transmission is theoretically possible through 
vector management. However, monitoring and controlling mealybugs through 
biological control methods and pesticides has proven ineffective to date (Daane et al. 
2012).    
The initial infection level is a third critical parameter that may affect the 
possibility and optimality of eradication. Lowering the initial infection level from the 
base value (2%) to the lowest possible level (0.02% or one initially infected vine), 
achieves eradication with a probability of 50% under optimal Strategy ImNSEW. At 
this initial infection level, Strategy ImNSEW yields an ENPV improvement of $2,000 
over the strategy of no disease control (difference between $462,000 and $460,000 in 
figure 2, panel c). The ENPV improvement is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
A research program targeting reductions of initial infection levels has a value of 
$88,000 under optimal Strategy ImNSEW (difference between $462,000 and $374,000 
in figure 2, panel c). For example, this result suggests that a sanitary program ensuring 
that 99.98% of the supplied planting material are virus-free (i.e., 0.02% initial 
infection level), may be justified if the cost is less than $88,000 for a 5.2 acre-vineyard 
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(e.g. the National Clean Plant Network of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Johnson 2009).   
2.5.2 Disease Control Costs 
Finally, we find that the ENPV improvement under the second-best Strategy (ImNS) is 
less sensitive to increases in disease control costs than under optimal Strategy 
ImNSEW. When the virus-test cost increases twofold (from 2.6 to 5.2 $/vine), Strategy 
ImNS becomes optimal. The ENPV improvement for the originally optimal, more 
testing-intensive Strategy ImNSEW, decreases by 8 percentage points (from 19% to 
11%, figure 3). In contrast, the ENPV improvement for Strategy ImNS decreases by 
just 4 percentage points (from 18% to 14%, figure 3). Beyond a fivefold cost increase 
(from 2.6 to 13 $/vine), Strategy ImNSEW becomes cost-ineffective (figure 3). We also 
vary the costs of roguing and replanting and find that, when the unit cost of roguing 
and replanting is 1.2 times higher than the base value, Strategy ImNSEW becomes cost-
ineffective. Strategy ImNS, on the other hand, retains its cost-effectiveness up to a 
break-even parameter value of $30/vine (4-fold increase over the base value).  
For vineyard managers, these sensitivity results highlight that, although 
Strategy ImNSEW is optimal under the base parameter values, second-best Strategy 
ImNS is less sensitive to changes in the costs of disease control. For scientists working 
on the disease, these results indicate that, although disease eradication can be 
optimally achieved if an early-detection technology is developed, the cost of this 
technology should not exceed $13/vine for it to be cost-effective in spatially 
controlling GLRD.  
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                     Strategy ImNS Strategy ImNSEW 
 
Figure 3. Sensitivity of the Expected Net Present Value to the Unit Virus-Test Cost  
 
2.6 Conclusions and Directions for Future Research  
There is growing interest in researching the economics of integrated spatial-dynamic 
processes in general, and pests and diseases in particular. This article features a plant-
level, bioeconomic model of grapevine leafroll disease diffusion and control in a 
vineyard. We analyze alternative disease control strategies that would not be possible 
using classical approaches. The originality of the results lies in the computational 
method’s ability to model a large number of bioeconomic, plant-level state variables.  
Our results show a general feature of spatial-dynamic processes: optimal 
policy interventions are those that achieve the temporally, spatially, and quantitatively 
optimal allocation of inputs. The results are particularly valuable for vineyard 
managers because they highlight the superiority of spatial strategies over nonspatial 
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strategies recommended to the industry. We also estimate the expected value of 
research programs aiming at decreasing or increasing the critical model parameters. 
These results can help guide research efforts of disease ecologists, plant pathologists, 
entomologists, and plant scientists involved in GLRD research. 
 This model has wider application possibilities and can be adapted to other crop 
diseases characterized by spatial-dynamic processes after adjustments for spatial 
configuration and input data. In particular, it can be employed to inform profit-
maximizing disease management in horticultural crops such as apple or citrus trees.  
 There are opportunities to extend the model as well. One extension would 
incorporate temporal price dynamics. If grape prices are substantially lower or higher 
than the mean price in the first year, optimal disease control strategies might be 
different than the ones identified in this article.  Another extension would allow for 
spatial externalities caused by the flow of vectors from neighboring infected vineyards 
left uncontrolled. We expect this situation to yield strategies that alter the spatial 
configuration of the vineyard in a way that slows down disease progression. One such 
strategy might involve the creation of barriers to disease diffusion (e.g. Sharov and 
Liebhold 1998; Brown, Lynch and Zilberman 2002; Foroutan 2003). Establishing “fire 
breaks” from an adjacent, infected vineyard may result in immediate yield losses that 
will need to be measured against the expected value of lower disease damages in the 
future. If cost-efficient, these designs might be recommended for the establishment of 
more disease-resistant vineyards and orchards with higher ENPVs.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
SPATIAL-DYNAMIC EXTERNALITIES AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR IN 
INFECTIOUS DISEASE CONTROL: APPLICATION TO VINEYARDS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Incompatible production practices within and among agricultural systems can be a 
source of negative externalities and potentially cause conflicts between growers. 
Examples of such conflicts include those that arose in California between cotton and 
olive growers over the spread of a plant disease (Parker 2000), between wheat and 
wine growers due to an herbicide drift in Washington (Corp and Darnell 2002), and 
between growers of genetically modified crops and conventional crops related to the 
dispersal of genetically modified pollen (Ceddia et al. 2011).  
 In these examples (disease spread, pesticide drift, pollen-mediated gene flow) 
conflict arises from negative externalities. That is, they are due to actions taken by 
growers that cause costs or damages borne by other growers. In particular, these 
externalities are spatial-dynamic. They are spatial because their marginal impacts 
decrease as distance between the source and sink of the externality increases. 
Moreover, these spatial impacts change over time according to the endogenous 
biophysical process governing the externality (e.g., inter- and intra-plot disease 
diffusion) and exogenously according to private and cooperative management 
strategies or even public policy (e.g., disease control).      
 A particularly interesting and policy-relevant subset of spatial-dynamic 
externalities in agriculture consists of those where total payoffs and cooperation to 
 58 
manage the externality depend directly on the inherent heterogeneity between agents. 
Such situations have been examined more generally by the public economics literature 
by asking whether and how inherent heterogeneity affects social welfare and 
cooperation in the provision of public goods. This literature has examined various 
dimensions of heterogeneity: inequality in income, assets, and stakes; and other types 
of inequality such as ethnic and social, gender, and diversity in resource management 
technology (e.g., fishing techniques) (Baland et al. 2007). Except for income and 
wealth inequality, the literature suggests that all other dimensions of heterogeneity 
have an unambiguously negative effect on collective action. As for income or wealth 
inequality, public economics theory is ambiguous in predicting whether or not 
heterogeneity facilitates or exacerbates cooperation, especially in decentralized 
settings where the establishment of a regulatory authority is not possible (Gaspart and 
Plateau 2001). Because heterogeneity is a multidimensional phenomenon, its influence 
on cooperation may differ depending on the type of public good studied and on 
whether benefits from cooperation are measured in terms of output, surplus, or utility 
(Baland et al 2007). For instance, Olson (1965) hypothesizes that inequality might 
favor the provision of a public good by increasing the likelihood that the wealthy can 
provide the public good independently of the actions of others. On the other hand, 
Warr (1983) shows that the private provision of a public good is independent of 
differences in income. In contrast, Kanbur and Keen (1993) show that heterogeneity 
can exacerbate inefficiency from noncooperative behavior. In addition, empirical 
evidence from the environmental and public economics literature has found harmful 
effects of inequality on cooperation (e.g., Bardhan 1995). Motivated by the ambiguity 
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of these results, Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan (2002) propose a model that captures 
both the positive and harmful effects of inequality on cooperation. They use a two-
player noncooperative model of conservation of a common-pool resource. They 
propose a U-shaped relationship between inequality and economic efficiency that is 
supported by empirical findings (Bardhan 2000; Khwaja 2007).  
 In this paper, we build on this literature to analyze the case of two neighboring 
wine grape growers who are heterogeneous in the wine grape quality they produce, 
and consequently, in the prices they receive. One grower produces high-value wine 
grapes and the other low-value wine grapes. They both face the spread of a grapevine 
viral disease that lowers grape yields and wine quality but only the high-value grower 
receives a price penalty for disease-affected grapes. Because of the infectious nature of 
the disease, the optimal disease control effort of one grower affects potential damages 
caused by the disease in the neighboring vineyard. We model the spatial-dynamic 
disease diffusion at the plant level within the vineyards using cellular automata as in 
Atallah et al. (2014). We also model disease diffusion between vineyards by 
specifying plant-level, distance- and density-dependent disease externalities. We solve 
for the noncooperative and cooperative disease management strategy for each grower. 
Subsequently, we use mean-preserving price differential contraction to show how 
heterogeneity between the two vineyards (i.e., the price differential) affects (a) the 
total payoff, (b) gains to cooperation, (c) whether cooperation is Pareto-improving, 
and (d) the relative magnitude of transfer payments between vineyards. We find that 
increased heterogeneity reduces the total payoff up to a point where cooperation 
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becomes Pareto-improving and the relationship between total payoff and heterogeneity 
becomes U-shaped. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
Examples of conflicts arising from incompatibility in production practices include 
conflicts between forestry and agriculture, between growers of different crops, and 
even between growers of the same crop growing differentiated products. Smoke from 
wildfires and prescribed burning in Western Australia caused wine produced from 
nearby vineyards to have undesirable smoke-like flavor (Fisher, Kennison and Ward 
2009). The physical drift and aerial dispersal of herbicides from wheat farmers to 
neighboring vineyards in the Walla Walla River Valley in Oregon and Washington 
states reduced foliage development and fruit set (Corp and Darnell 2002). Finally, 
with premiums for organic products and potential premiums for non-genetically 
modified (non-GM) food, recent research considers spatial policies that can remediate 
‘contamination’ from conventional to organic crops and from GM-crops to non-GM 
crops (Ceddia et al. 2011). 
  Such policies are sometimes referred to as coexistence policies. Ceddia et al. 
(2011) compared the effects of several coexistence policy variables on maximizing 
joint grower benefits while reducing negative externalities arising from pollen-
mediated gene flow from GM-crops (‘externality emitters’) to non-GM crops 
(‘externality recipients’). First, they consider a mandatory buffer zone to the emitters 
of the externality (i.e., abatement). Second, they analyze two taxes, one imposed on 
the emitters of the externality (accounting for the contamination and recipient’s self-
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protection through a buffer area) and another on the recipient of the externality 
(accounting for the generator’s abatement through a buffer area). Third, they consider 
a mechanism to incentivize both emitters and recipients to invest in coordination 
effort. Their simulation findings suggest that coordination to spatially cluster is most 
effective at reducing the externality, followed by the creation of buffer zones between 
GM-crops and non-GM crops.  Similarly, Parker and Munroe (2007) provide 
empirical evidence externalities influence the location and spatial clustering of organic 
farms in California. 
 Inter-farm diffusion of pests and diseases is similar to pesticide drift and 
pollen-mediated gene flow in that it causes distance-dependent, spatial externalities. 
That is, the marginal impacts of spatial externalities decrease with the distance 
between emitters and recipients of the pest or disease. By contrast, however, managing 
externalities generated by plant pests and diseases is not limited to ex-ante (e.g., 
regulation) and ex-post (e.g., liability) measures as in the case of GM-crops (Demont 
et al., 2009; Beckman et al. 2010). Plant pests and diseases are controlled through 
spatio-temporal efforts exerted at fine temporal scales during the unfolding of the 
biophysical process responsible for the externality, thus giving it its spatial-dynamic 
nature. In addition to being distant dependent, the externality in the case of pests and 
diseases is density dependent. In other words, it depends on the location and number 
of the plants emitting the externality. More importantly, in the case of infectious 
diseases, the externality might need to be specified as a function of the infection and 
age states of individuals so that ‘recipients’ become ‘emitters’ after infection. 
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 In this paper, we consider the case of Grapevine Leafroll Disease (GLRD), the 
most important viral disease threatening grape harvests and wine production in the 
United States (Fuchs et al. 2009; Golino et al. 2008; Martin et al. 2005) and around the 
world (Cabaleiro et al. 2008; Charles et al. 2009; Martelli and Boudon-Padieu 2006). 
This viral disease reduces yield, delays fruit ripening, and negatively affects wine 
quality by lowering soluble solids and increasing fruit juice acidity (Goheen and Cook 
1959; Martinson et al. 2008). Its economic impact was recently estimated at $25,000- 
$40,000 per hectare if the disease is left uncontrolled, which represents more than 75% 
of a vineyard’s net present value (Atallah et al. 2012). GLRD is primarily introduced 
to vineyards through infected planting material. Once introduced, the disease can be 
transmitted from vine to vine by several species of mealybugs and soft-scale insects 
(Martelli and Boudon-Padieu 2006; Pietersen 2006; Tsai et al. 2010). Mealybugs can 
transmit GLRD within and across vineyards in at least three ways (Charles et al. 2009; 
Grasswitz and James 2008). Insects crawling on wires and fruiting canes can cause 
disease transmission to neighboring vines.  Vineyard management activities can 
facilitate mealybug dispersal to farther neighboring vines within the same vineyard. 
Additionally, disease spread between neighboring blocks or vineyards can take place 
through aerial dispersal of mealybugs (Le Maguet et al. 2013).  
 Vineyard managers are currently advised to avoid introducing GLRD into their 
vineyards by planting certified vines derived from virus-tested mother plants (Almeida 
et al. 2013; Fuchs 2007; Golino et al. 2002). However, when GLRD is already present, 
disease management consists mainly of minimizing the source of infection by 
removing symptomatic vines after harvest, especially the young ones and replacing 
 63 
them with virus-tested vines (Maree et al. 2013; Rayapati, O’Neil and Walsh 2008; 
Walton et al. 2009). Managing disease vectors is recommended to reduce disease 
transmission (Skinsis et al. 2009). Although insecticide sprays can reduce mealybug 
densities, they have not been effective at controlling GLRD spread, mainly because of 
the exceptionally low insect density needed for disease transmission (Almeida et al. 
2013; Cabaleiro and Segura 2006, 2007; Golino et al., 2002, 2008). 
Most GLRD research has focused on studying the pathogens with less work 
done on disease ecology and disease management (Almeida et al 2013). Nonetheless, 
recent research has evaluated nonspatial and spatial GLRD control strategies in a 
virtual, isolated vineyard (Atallah et al. 2014). Using computational experiments, the 
authors show that spatial strategies improve the expected net present value of a 
vineyard by around 20% over the strategy of no disease control. In these strategies, 
young symptomatic vines are rogued and replaced, and their nonsymptomatic 
immediate neighbors are virus-tested, then rogued and replaced if the test is positive. It 
is not immediately clear, however, whether these spatial disease control strategies 
remain profit-maximizing in cases where disease diffusion is characterized by an 
“edge effect”. Charles et al. (2009) refer to an “edge effect” when the number of 
infected grapevines is decreasing with the distance from the edge of the vineyard to 
the source of infection. In the case of GLRD, the edge is typically an entry point for 
vectors carried by wind from a neighboring vineyard serving as a GLRD reservoir 
(Grasswitz and James 2008). Once mealybugs enter a vineyard through aerial 
dispersal, they are able to move between adjacent plants. In the presence of aerial 
dispersal from a neighboring vineyard, roguing and replanting strategies are likely to 
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be less effective and additional control measures might be necessary (Rayapati et al. 
2008). Some studies examining spatial diffusion of GLRD report clusters of infected 
vines at the borders of a vineyard. These studies measure inter-vineyard GLRD spread 
as a diffusion gradient, with diminishing disease incidence from the border towards 
the center of the vineyard (Cabaleiro and Segura 1997, 2008). In most cases, the 
diffusion gradient increases in the opposite direction of an adjacent, older, infected 
vineyard (Klaassen et al. 2011). The major environmental factor affecting long-
distance mealybug aerial dispersal is wind, which has been shown to disperse 
mealybugs across distances greater than 50 km (Barrass, Jerie, and Ward 1994).  
Inter-vineyard GLRD transmission can be depicted as a problem of 
transboundary renewable resource management in ecologically-connected and 
independently-managed systems (Munro 1979; Bhat and Huffaker 2007). In the case 
of agricultural diseases, differences in the value of the product can affect disease 
control strategies employed by growers. Using plot-level panel data, Lybbert et al. 
(2010) find that high-value winegrape growers make greater efforts to control 
powdery mildew (fungal disease) treatment strategies in response to disease forecast 
information more than their low-value counterparts. Fuller (2011) finds that the 
optimal strategy for winegrape growers is to abandon the blocks infected by Pierce’s 
Disease (bacterial disease) if prices paid for grapes were below a certain threshold. In 
ecologically-connected vineyards, such difference in product value or price 
differential might cause conflicts in disease management strategies whereby the low-
value vineyard acts as a vector reservoir of GLRD for the high-value vineyard. When 
vineyards are independently managed, negative spatial externalities can arise due to 
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the failure of one grower to internalize the negative externality of his disease 
management decisions on his neighbor’s expected net revenues.  
 Traditionally, the literature on the economics of controlling insect-borne plant 
diseases has examined the temporal dimensions of disease control strategies (e.g. Hall 
and Norgaard. 1973; Regev et al. 1976). In the last decade, however, studies have 
concentrated on the spatial dimensions of disease control strategies.  Brown et al. 
(2002) show that vineyard managers can maximize profits by planting barriers or by 
removing the source of Pierce’s Disease. Their model, however, is static and largely 
ignores certain critical production costs such as replanting. More importantly, the 
authors fail to consider adjacent vineyards and incentives for cooperation in 
controlling the disease. More recently, Fuller et al. (2011) address the limitations of 
Brown et al. (2002) and show that cooperative management of Pierce’s Disease can 
reduce grapevine losses and land abandonment. Nevertheless, their study does not 
identify specific cooperation mechanisms among vineyard managers.   
This study contributes to the public economics literature by improving our 
understanding on how inherent heterogeneity affects strategic behavior and total 
payoff. The particular case study of an agricultural infectious disease contributes to the 
bioeconomics and resource economics literature by modeling the spatial and dynamic 
dimensions of inter-farm disease transmission at the plant-level, as opposed to using 
farm-level specifications (e.g.,  Keeling et al. 2001) or fixed diffusion rates (e.g., 
Fuller et al. 2011). Finally, this work extends previous research on disease 
management in vineyards where inter-vineyard transmission was not considered 
(Atallah et al. 2014).  
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We embed the disease diffusion model in a two-agent bargaining game to 
generate distributions of payoffs under all possible combinations of disease 
management strategies. To do this, we build on the literature on transboundary 
resource management that has used game-theoretic frameworks to characterize 
bargaining games between adjacent resource managers (Munro 1979; Sumaila 1997; 
Bhat and Huffaker 2004). We use the Nash bargaining framework to estimate the 
magnitude of the cooperative surplus and transfer payments between growers. 
 
3.3 A Bioeconomic Model of Disease Diffusion under Spatial-Dynamic 
Externalities 
We consider two ecologically-connected, independently-managed vineyard plots. 
Vineyard   produces high-value winegrapes whereas vineyard  produces low-value 
winegrapes. Vineyard  is represented by grid that is the set of  cells denoted 
by their row and column position  and representing grapevines. Similarly, 
Vineyard  is represented by grid that consists of  cells denoted by their row 
and column position . The economic problem and spatial-dynamic disease 
diffusion constraints faced by the managers of vineyards   and    are structurally 
similar and only differ in their initial conditions and bioeconomic parameters. We 
therefore restrict the model description to plot . The disease is introduced through 
infected plant material to vineyard   , from which it spreads to vineyard . Each 
grapevine is modeled as a cellular automaton that updates its infection state in each 
discrete time based on the infection state of its immediate neighbors and on long-
distance disease diffusion. A vine’s infection state transitions are governed by a 
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Markov Chain model. We first expose the growers’ private profit maximization 
problem. Later, we expose the Nash bargaining maximization problem under 
cooperative disease management.   
 The objective of ’s manager is to maximize the expected net present value 
( ) of vineyard plot  by choosing an optimal disease control strategy from a 
discrete set of spatial and nonspatial strategies, . In each strategy, the grower 
decides, for each vine in cell  in each period  of  discrete periods of time, 
whether or not to rogue and replant (  if roguing takes place, 0 otherwise), 
test for the virus (  if virus testing takes place, 0 otherwise), or rogue without 
replanting ( , if roguing without replanting take place, 0 otherwise).
17
 The 
grower’s disease control decisions are based on a vine’s composite age-infection 
state  . The composite age-infection state is defined as the combination of a 
vine’s age state  and its infection state . 
 The optimal strategy  is the sequence of vine-level control variables 
{ } that allocates disease control effort over space and time so as to 
yield the maximum ENPV improvement over the strategy of no disease control. 
Letting
 
 be the expectation operator over the random vine-level revenue ,  
the discount factor
18
 at time t (in months) where t {0, 1, 2,…, 600}, the objective of a 
vineyard manager is to maximize the ENPV as follows:  
                                                 
17 ‘Roguing and replanting’ and ‘roguing without replanting’ are mutually exclusive strategies. 
18
  , where  is the discount rate.  
 
 68 
 
subject to: 
(2) , which is the vine-level infection state transition 
equation where  is the transpose of the infection state transition probability 
matrix .     
The first expression in the curly brackets of equation (1) represents the revenue 
of a vine in location  and in age-infection state  at time t. If a vineyard 
manager decided to rogue and replant vine  in the last  periods, then  
is equal to 1 and the revenue is pre-multiplied by zero for a period of  until the 
replant bears fruit, where , and .
19
 If a 
vineyard manager decides to rogue a vine without replanting it ( ), the 
revenue from the cell corresponding to this vine equals zero from t to T. The second 
expression in the curly brackets represents the cost of roguing-and-replanting ( ), 
the cost of testing ( ), and the cost of roguing-without-replanting ( ), pre-
multiplied by their corresponding binary decision variables. 
A vine’s infection and age states map into a third dynamic state variable, its 
economic value, or per-vine revenue  defined as follows:  
                                                 
19
 This condition says that roguing and replanting in cell  cannot occur more than once in  
periods. It implies that a replant is never rogued before it bears fruit. 
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(3)   
                       
(4)  
Per-vine revenue equals zero if the vine’s age   is below  (equation 3). 
Beyond that age,  is known to the vineyard manager at time . Nevertheless, the 
per-vine revenue is random for periods prior to  because it depends on the vine’s 
infection state . This is because GLRD causes a yield reduction of  compared 
to the yield of a healthy vine ( ). In addition, grapes from GLRD-affected 
vines are subject to a price penalty  (equation 4) on the price paid for grapes 
harvested from healthy vines ( ). The same description applies to cells (m, 
n) in grid (see table 3.1 for the notational differences between vineyards H and L).
20  
                                                 
20 Yield form a vine in the Healthy state ( ) is obtained by dividing per-acre yield in plot 
H ( ) over planting density ( ). 
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21
 CDFA (2014) 
22
 Klonsky, Karen, and Pete Livingston. 2009. Cabernet Sauvignon Vine Loss Calculator. Davis, CA: 
University of California 
23
 Klonsky, Karen, and Pete Livingston. 2009. Cabernet Sauvignon Vine Loss Calculator. Davis, CA: 
University of California 
24
 Equivalent to an annual discount rate of 5% 
Table 3.1 Economic Parameters Faced by Managers of Plots and  
 
    
Vineyard layout 
Grid dimensions 
(rows*columns) 
 68*23=1,564   49*16=784 
Grid row (vine) spacing (ft.)  4   5 
Grid column spacing (ft.)
 
  7   11 
    
Revenue parameters 
Per-vine revenue 
 
Random (eq. 2)  
 
Random (eq. 2) 
Grapes price ($/ton)
21
 
 
5,058 
 
  
726 
 
Price penalty (%) 
 
70  
 
0 
Yield (tons/acre)  4.5   10 
Yield (tons/acre/month)  0.375   0.834 
Planting density (vines/acre)  1,564   784 
Yield (tons/vine/year) 
Yield (tons/vine/month) 
 
0.0029 
0.0002 
 
 
0.0128 
0.0011 
Yield reduction (%) 
 
Depends on    
Depends on 
 
  
30  
 
30 
  
50  
 
50 
  
75  
 
75 
 
Cost parameters  
Roguing and replanting 
22
($/vine) 
 
14.6  
 
14.6 
Roguing
23
 ($/vine) 
 
8  
 
8 
Testing ($/vine) 
 
2.6  
 
2.6 
      
Discount factor (month
 -1
) 
24
  0.9959   0.9959 
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 We now describe how the infection state transition probability matrix P 
governs disease diffusion. Vines in state Healthy are susceptible to infection. They get 
exposed to the virus with a neighborhood-dependent probability b. At this point, they 
enter a latency period during which they are nonsymptomatic and noninfective. At 
first, the virus population in the vine is below levels that can be detected by virus tests 
and the vine is in a state labeled Exposed-undetectable. The virus population reaches 
detectable levels with probability c (i.e., the vine transitions to state Exposed-
detectable). The transition to state Infective-moderate (Im) happens with a probability 
 and marks the end of the latency period and the beginning of the infectivity period 
as well as the onset of visual symptoms. Symptoms, which consist of reddening and 
downward rolling of the leaves, are at moderate severity state first (Infective-
moderate, Im), and subsequently transition to a state of high severity, or Infective-high 
(Ih), with a probability . Mathematically, P can be expressed as follows:
25
  
 
(5) P =      
  
 In equation (5),  is the Healthy to Exposed-undetectable transition probability 
conditional on previous own and neighborhood infection states. It can be expressed as:  
                                                 
25
P reads from row (states H, Eu, Ed, Im, and Ih at time t) to column (states H, Eu, Ed, Im, and Ih at time 
t+1).   
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(6)          
        
In equation (6), is the infectivity state of a vine’s von Neumann 
neighborhood.
26
 For example, = (I, I, I, NI) is the state of a neighborhood 
composed of two Infective (I) neighbors in the same column (within-column 
neighbors), one Infective neighbor in the adjacent column (across-column neighbor) 
and one Noninfective (NI) neighbor in the other adjacent column (across-column 
neighbor). Given that each of the four neighbors can be in one of two infectivity states 
                                                 
26
 This type of neighborhood represents the most common vertical trellis system where a vine is in 
contact with its four neighbors in the cardinal directions. In contrast, a horizontal trellis system favors 
contact with up to eight neighbors (Cabaleiro and Segura 2006) and could be represented by a Moore 
neighborhood. 
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(I or NI),  can be in one of the 2
4
 states listed in equation (6).
 
Parameters α, β, and 
 are defined in the following section.  
Short-distance disease diffusion 
Parameters α and β  are the within-column and across-column transmission rates with 
, suggesting that Infective vines transmit the disease to their neighbors 
within the grid column at a higher rate than they transmit it to their neighbors situated 
in the adjacent grid column. We choose this neighborhood-based infection state 
transition to reflect patterns of GLRD diffusion observed in spatial analyses where the 
disease is shown to spread preferentially along grid columns (Habili et al. 1995; Le 
Maguet et al. 2013). We assume that within- and across-column infections occur 
independently with rate parameters and . That is, the time a vine stays in the 
Healthy state before transitioning to the Exposed-undetectable state is an 
exponentially-distributed random variable, with rate  for within-column state 
transitions and rate  for across-column state transitions. In each time step, a random 
variable  determines whether a Healthy vine transitions to the Exposed-undetectable 
state. A Healthy vine that has one within-column Infective neighbor (e.g., 
) receives the infection at time t+1 if   , where  is 
a random draw from ~ (0, 1). Conversely, the disease is not transmitted 
if . Similarly, a Healthy vine that has one across-column Infective 
neighbor (e.g., ) receives the infection at time t+1 if  
 and does not receive the infection if  . When two or more 
transmission types are realized (e.g., when a vine has one Infective within-column 
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neighbor and one Infective across-column neighbor), the disease transmission is 
determined by the shortest of the waiting times (Cox 1959).
27
 
Long-distance disease diffusion 
Long-distance dispersal of mealybug vectors from  to is governed by a random 
variable T3 , which is independently distributed with p.d.f. . Here,   is a 
power-law dispersal parameter specified by the following spatial-dynamic, distance- 
and density-dependent dispersal function:
 
 
 
(7a) 
 
 
(7b) 
 
For any vine ( ),  is inversely proportional to the distance from the 
shared border (i.e., column  for  and column ( ) for ).
28
  We choose a 
power-law dispersal specification because it allows us to model the GLRD inter-
vineyard transmission characteristic whereby new infection foci of infection emerge 
beyond the disease front (Gibson 1997; Reynolds 2011). The parameter is also 
proportional to the total number of Infective vines in , weighted by their column 
position  (numerator in equation 7a).
29
 Weighting each Infective vine by its column 
position  allows vines in bordering columns to contribute more to the externality than 
                                                 
27 We compare the random variable with the transition probability in each time step because the state of 
a vine’s neighborhood is changing over time, thus changing the probability that a vine receives the 
infection in each time interval. 
28
 For the power-law dispersal parameter , we use the estimated slope ( =3) of the disease gradient 
obtained by regressing the natural logarithm of GLRD incidence on the natural logarithm of the 
distance (column position) in the Sisan vineyard plot in table 1 of Cabaleiro and Segura (1997).   
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vines situated farther from the border (i.e., distance-dependence).The denominator in 
equation (7a) allows the multiplier of the power-law expression (the term in the double 
summation) to vary between 0 and 1 as the number of Infective vines in  varies 
between 0 and . Once vines in vineyard  become Infective, they can act a 
source of infection for Healthy vines in vineyard  according to equation (7b), thus 
making the externality reciprocal.
30
  
 When more than one type of disease transmission occurs, such as when a vine 
has one Infective within-column neighbor (short-distance disease diffusion) and is 
situated on the border of the vineyard (long-distance disease diffusion), the realized 
type of transmission is determined by the smaller value among T1 , T2  and T3  (Cox 
1959). For descriptions of probabilities c, d, and f, we refer the reader to Atallah et al. 
(2014). Symbols, definitions, values, and references for the disease diffusion 
parameters are presented in table 2.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 In situations where the externality needs to be asymmetrical (e.g., because of prevailing winds),  can 
be given different values in equations 7a and 7b. Note that a value of zero in bot equations collapses the 
model to the one in Atallah et al. (2014). 
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3.4 Experimental Design  
We design and implement Monte Carlo experiments to evaluate various disease 
control strategies by comparing their economic outcomes to those resulting from a no 
disease control strategy. Each experiment consists of a set of 1,000 simulations run 
simultaneously for both vineyard plots, over 600 months. Experiments differ in the 
disease control strategies employ. Outcome realizations for a given run within an 
experiment differ due to random spatial initialization in , and due to random spatial 
disease diffusion within and between vineyards. Data collected over simulation runs 
are the probability density functions of the ENPVs under each strategy.  
3.4.1 Model initialization  
Grapevines are initialized as Healthy and of age equal zero in both vineyard 
plots and  (high- and low-value vineyard, respectively). At one percent of 
the grapevines in  are chosen at random from a uniform spatial distribution  (0, 
) to transition from Healthy to Exposed (recall that  is the total number of 
grapevines in where  and are the number of rows and columns, respectively). 
This reflects findings in GLRD studies indicating that primary infection sources are 
randomly spatially distributed (Cabaleiro et al. 2008), and that initial disease 
prevalence is typically between one and five percent (Atallah et al. 2012). 
Subsequently, GLRD spreads to Healthy vines within  according to the infection-
state transition Markov Chain process in equation (4). The Infective vines in  act as 
a primary source of long-distance disease diffusion to the Healthy vines in . The 
disease spreads from  to  according to the distance- and density-dependent 
dispersal function  (equation 7a). Subsequently, Infective vines in  act as a 
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source of reinfection in according to the distance- and density-dependent dispersal 
function  (equation 7b). Symbols, definitions, values, and references for the 
economic parameters (e.g., prices, quality penalty, and disease control costs) are 
presented in table 3.1. 
3.4.2 Disease control strategies      
The discrete set of disease control strategies, , includes three subsets, namely 
nonspatial, spatial, and fire-break strategies. In the subset of nonspatial strategies, the 
vineyard manager decides whether to rogue and replace symptomatic vines based on 
their symptoms (Infective-moderate; Infective-high) with or without considering their 
age (Young: 0-5 years; Mature: 6-19 years; Old: 20 years and above). There are eight 
nonspatial strategies (Strategy 1 to Strategy 8 in table 2.4).
31 
In the subset of spatial 
strategies, the vineyard manager decides whether to rogue and replant vines as soon as 
they develop symptoms (Infective-moderate), test their neighbors and rogue-and-
replace them if they test positive. If a vine tests positive, it is removed in the same 
period. We simulate 10 spatial strategies (Strategy 9 to Strategy 18 in table 2.4). Note 
that, when implementing nonspatial or spatial strategies, a manager’s disease risk 
depends heavily on whether the neighboring vineyard’s manager controls for the 
disease or not. In these strategies, disease control in one vineyard is a strategic 
complement to disease control in the neighboring vineyard.   
The third subset includes fire-break strategies that consist in roguing (without 
replanting) vines in the border columns of a vineyard in order to create ‘fire-breaks’ or 
                                                 
31
 We exclude the strategy of roguing and replacing Infective-high and Young (IhY) because this age-
infection combination cannot be reached; it takes a vine more than 5 years to transition to the Infective-
high state. 
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‘buffer zones’ that would reduce long-distance disease diffusion from to  to  
(Strategy 19 to Strategy 25 in table 3.2). Fire-break strategies are intended to decrease 
the effect of spillovers between vineyards and can give a manager full control over 
their disease risk. In these strategies, disease control in one vineyard is a strategic 
substitute to disease control in the neighboring vineyard.   
The scenario of no disease provides a baseline to compute the expected disease 
economic cost under each candidate control strategy (Strategies 1-25). All strategies 
are available to both growers.  
 
3.5 Solution Frameworks 
We employ the objective function (equation 1) to rank the vineyard expected net 
present values under the alternative strategies for an individual vineyard. The 
objective function takes into account the total amount of control effort exerted under 
each strategy as well as the timing, intensity and location of the control. We first solve 
the social planner problem. The solution to this problem is relevant for situations 
where vineyard management companies manage contiguous vineyards that produce 
Table 3.2  ‘Fire-break’ Disease Control Strategies: definitions and acronyms 
# Description  Acronym 
19 Roguing (without replacing) all the vines in the bordering column in 
GL.  
1Col 
20 Roguing (without replacing) all the vines in two bordering columns 
in GL.  
2Col 
21 Roguing (without replacing) all the vines in three bordering columns 
in GL. 
3Col 
… … … 
25 Roguing (without replacing) all the vines in all M columns in GL 
(remove the entire vineyard). 
16Col 
 
a Strategies are assumed to be implemented  at , which corresponds to the moment when initially infected 
vines in  develop visual leafroll symptoms. 
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different qualities of wine grapes. Second, we solve for the noncooperative solution. 
Third, we search for the cooperative solution using the Nash bargaining framework 
whenever the cooperative surplus is strictly positive. 
3.5.1 Social planner  
The social planner chooses the optimal pair of disease management strategies 
that maximizes the total payoff given by , the sum of the expected 
net present values of  ( ) and  ( ). The social planner solves the 
following maximization problem: 
(8a)  , subject to: 
 (2)  , and 
(8b)   
where equations (2) and (8d) are the vine-level infection state transition equations in 
 and , respectively. 
3.5.2 Noncooperative disease control 
In this case each vineyard manager solves his private ENPV maximization problem 
subject to disease diffusion in his vineyard and the disease externality from the 
neighboring vineyard by choosing one of the eighteen nonspatial and spatial strategies 
available to him (Strategies 1 through 18 in table 2.4). Because the disease is 
initialized in vineyard , we first solve for the optimal strategies of ’s manager. 
Then, given optimal disease control in , the manager of   solves for his optimal 
control strategy. 
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3.5.3 Cooperative disease control: Nash bargaining game 
The expected payoffs of noncooperative strategies constitute the players’ threat points 
in a cooperative setting (Nash 1953). If the two vineyards are cooperatively managed, 
the two managers solve the Nash bargaining game to find payoffs that ensure the 
existence of a mutually beneficial agreement. The Nash bargaining solution is the 
unique pair of cooperative payoffs ( ) that solves the following 
maximization problem (Nash 1953):  
(9)  ,  
subject to: 
(10)     
and subject to the disease diffusion functions in  (equation 2) and  (equation 8b). 
Equation (10) is the incentive compatibility constraint, which guarantees that players 
have incentives to cooperate and do not resort to their credible noncooperative threat 
with payoffs . The maximand in equation (9), known as the Nash product, is 
the product of the differences between the cooperative and noncooperative payoffs 
from  and . Under the standard axiomatic bargaining theory, equation (9) has the 
following unique solution (Muthoo 1999):
32
  
(11)   
(12)   
                                                 
32 The axioms are individual rationality, invariance to equivalent utility representations, symmetry, and 
independence of irrelevant alternatives. 
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In the solution described by equations (11) and (12), the growers agree that 
each gets his expected noncooperative payoff first (i.e., the payoff of the threat point, 
or the disagreement point). Subsequently, they split the expected cooperative surplus 
equally. The latter is defined as the difference between the total expected cooperative 
payoff ( ) and the total expected noncooperative payoff 
( ). The expected cooperative surplus is also a 
measure of the Pareto-inefficiency caused by noncooperative disease control.  
 We also solve a cooperative game that features alternating offers through an 
infinite time horizon (Rubenstein 1982) and obtain the same solution as in the Nash 
bargaining game. Both bargaining games have the same optimal solution because our 
players have the same discount rate. In situations where players have different 
discount rates, the cooperative surplus is shared proportionally so that more ‘patient’ 
players get a higher share of the surplus.
33
  
 
3.6 Results and Discussion 
We find that, under the baseline case, both managers find it optimal not to control the 
disease in a noncooperative setting. The optimal solution is cooperative and consists of 
the high-value manager paying the low-value manager to spatially control the disease. 
We find that the relationship between heterogeneity, as expressed by the price 
differential, and social welfare, as measured by total payoff, is U-shaped. 
 
                                                 
33 Our result is also a special case of the solution to the generalized (or asymmetric) Nash bargaining 
game where players have the same ‘bargaining power’ (Muthoo 1999, p. 35). Muthoo (1999, p. 52) also 
shows that the bargaining outcome generated by the Nash bargaining game is identical to the outcome 
generated by the basic alternating-offers model (Rubenstein 1982) when bargaining costs are small.  
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3.6.1 Social planner 
Simulation results indicate that, under the baseline prices ( =$5,058/ton; 
=$726/ton) , the total payoff is highest ($364,000/acre) when the disease is managed 
in both vineyards under the spatial strategy that targets symptomatic vines and their 
two immediate, within-column neighbors (Strategy ImNS) (table 3.3). The ENPV 
improvement of this strategy over a strategy of no control is $60,000/acre, or 
approximately 20%. This is similar to the 18% ENPV improvement in Atallah et al. 
(2014) in the context of a vineyard with no externalities. 
 
3.6.2 Noncooperative disease control 
In a noncooperative setting, the manager of the low-value vineyard GL finds it optimal 
not to control the disease. In this case his vineyard’s ENPV is $62,000/acre (table 3.3). 
Table 3.3 Expected Payoffs under the Social Planner, Noncooperative, and Cooperative Solutions 
(baseline prices =$5,058/ton and =$726/ton)   
 Expected Payoffs
 a
 ($1,000/acre over 50 years) 
Strategies (G1, G2) 
Payoff 
to GH 
Payoff 
to GL 
Total 
payoff 
Cooperative 
Surplus
 b
 
Fixed 
Transfer 
Payment 
to GL
c
 
 
Cooperative 
Payoff to 
GH 
 
Cooperative 
Payoff to GL 
Social planner        
ImNS, ImNS 305 (4) 59 (6) 364 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Noncooperative   
  
 
   
no control, no control 243 (5)
d
 62 (1) 305  n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Cooperative  
     
  
ImNS, ImNS 305 (4) 59 (6) 364 60
***
  32  273  91 
no, Col16 362 (1) -6 (0) 356 51
***
 93 269 87 
n/a is not applicable. 
a 
 Expectations are
 
obtained from 1,000 simulations. 
 
b
 Cooperative Surplus= Total payoff (Cooperative)-Total payoff ( Noncooperative) 
c
 Fixed Transfer Payment =Expected Payoff (Noncooperative)–Expected Payoff (Cooperative)+50%*Expected Cooperative 
surplus. 
d 
Standard deviations in parentheses.
 
*** 
Significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
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GL’s second-best strategy is ImNS, which yields and ENPV of $59,000/acre (not shown 
in table 3.3).
34
 Given GL’s decision of not controlling the disease, GH’s optimal 
response is not to control the disease either, yielding an ENPV of about $243,000/acre. 
The strategy of ‘no control’ is therefore a credible threat point for GL in a cooperative 
game. Intuitively, the optimality of ‘no control’ for GH depends on the magnitude of 
the externality (parameter  in equation 7a): the value of is such that, no matter what 
GH does to control the disease, if GL does not practice some disease control to reduce 
the externality, GH will be better off doing nothing. GH’s second-best strategy is 
nonspatial Strategy ImY ($222,000/acre) (not shown in table 3.3). The optimal 
noncooperative expected payoffs for growers GH and GL are $243,000 and $62,000, 
respectively (table 3.3).  
 The solution to the social planner’s problem indicates that, if the two vineyard 
managers cooperate and agree to implement spatial Strategy ImNS 
35
 in their respective 
vineyards, then the total payoff ( ) would be 20% higher than in the 
noncooperative setting. These benefits to cooperation are consistent with previous 
studies on cooperative harvesting in fisheries (Sumaila 1997) and nuisance wildlife 
species (Bhat and Huffaker 2007). However, strategy ImNS makes GL worse off 
relative to the strategy of no disease control. In this case, the two growers could enter 
into a self-enforcing cooperative agreement that includes side payments negotiated ex-
                                                 
34 Recall that these strategies consist of roguing-and-replanting the moderately infected and young vines 
(ImY); roguing-and-replanting the symptomatic vines, testing their two nonsymptomatic neighbors and 
roguing-and-replanting them if they test positive (ImNS). 
35
 Recall that this strategy consists of roguing and replacing symptomatic vines (Im) then testing their 
nonsymptomatic immediate neighbors (NS) and roguing them if they test positive.  
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ante and threats by each vineyard manager to revert to noncooperative behavior if a 
party breaches the agreement.   
3.6.3 Cooperative disease control 
A cooperative disease management game unfolds as follows. At the beginning of the 
game, the vineyard managers negotiate a Pareto-efficient disease management 
agreement that includes a single lump-sum side payment made by the manager who 
benefits from cooperation to the manager that loses in a cooperative setting. The 
managers monitor the evolution of the game, ensuring that cooperative disease 
management is in place and that payments are made on the agreed-upon schedule. 
Growers continue cooperating unless one of them violates the agreement. If either one 
manager fails to pay or the other fails to implement the cooperative disease 
management strategy, the other party reverts to their credible threat strategy of no 
disease control.  In order for the cooperative disease management strategy to be 
Pareto-efficient, the manager who gains from cooperation compensates the other 
manager for the difference between his noncooperative and cooperative expected 
payoffs. In addition, the managers get equal share of the total benefits resulting from 
cooperation.  
 According to this solution framework, the size of the fixed transfer payment 
from GH to GL is $32,000/acre (table 3.3). After this transfer, both managers are better 
off than under the noncooperative setting ($273,000 vs. $243,000 for GH and $91,000 
vs. $59,000 for GL, table 3.3).  The cooperative surplus is $60,000/acre and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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 This set of spatial control strategies assumes that enforcement costs are 
negligible for both growers. However, disease monitoring costs might be high and 
thus cause the optimal roguing-and-replanting strategy to yield lower total expected 
payoffs than alternative strategies. Monitoring would involve GH observing whether 
GL is identifying symptomatic vines, roguing-and-replacing them, and testing-and-
roguing their immediate nonsymptomatic neighbors. In contrast, the buffer or ‘fire-
break’ cooperative strategies are likely to have low monitoring costs for GH (Strategies 
19 to 25, table 2.4). These strategies do not require the monitoring needed in the 
spatial control strategies (visual identification of GLRD symptoms, testing, 
replanting). They only require GH to verify that GL has removed the bordering 
vineyard rows. In situations where disease monitoring costs are too high for 
cooperative Strategy (ImNS, ImNS) to remain optimal, Strategy (no control, 16Col) 
yields the highest ENPV improvement among the fire-break strategies. According to 
this strategy, GH pays GL to remove all his vines (all sixteen columns in grid GL), in 
which case GH does not need to control any disease. The cooperative surplus under 
this strategy is $51,000, which is statistically different from zero at the 1% level (table 
3.3). The difference in cooperative surplus between cooperative Strategy (no control, 
16Col) and cooperative Strategy (ImNS, ImNS) is $9,000. Disease monitoring costs 
would need to be higher than this difference before fire-break Strategy (no control, 
16Col) is preferred to the spatial Strategy (ImNS, ImNS). In addition, note that although 
monitoring costs would be lower under this fire-break strategy, the higher relative 
magnitude of the required transfer payment compared to the cooperative surplus 
suggest that cooperation might be harder to achieve under this strategy.  
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3.6.4 Effect of the spatial price differential on strategic behavior and total payoff 
In order to measure how the price differential between vineyards affects their strategic 
decision to cooperate, we solve the problem for six additional price pairs under all 
three solution frameworks. Starting with the baseline price pair (case 6, table 3.4), we 
conduct five mean-preserving price differential contractions (cases 1 to 5, table3. 4) 
and one mean-preserving price differential expansion (case 7, table 3.4). Note that the 
price differential is equal to zero in case 1 and it increases as we move to case 7.  
 Results in table 3.4 show that the price differential has a substantial influence 
on the managers’ strategic behavior and their payoffs. These results can be discussed 
in terms of two distinct management situations. First, in cases 1 through 5, the high 
values of justify the implementation of Strategy ImNS in vineyard block . In a 
noncooperative setting, the disease externality is reduced enough that ‘no control’ is 
justified in vineyard block . The optimal noncooperative outcome is therefore (no 
control, ImNS). In these five cases, although the cooperative surplus is strictly positive 
and significantly different from zero at the 1% level, it is too small to satisfy the 
incentive compatibility constraint of GH (equation 10) and cooperation does not take 
place. If the two vineyards were managed by a single entity, they would both be 
managed according to Strategy ImNS and total payoff would be higher by $200 to 
2,000/acre (table 3.4, cases 1 through 5).   
 The second situation is given in cases 6 and 7 where the low values of do 
not justify the implementation of any disease control in vineyard block . In a 
noncooperative setting, subjected to the uncontrolled externality,  finds it optimal 
not to control the disease either. The optimal noncooperative outcome is therefore (no 
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Table 3.4 Impact of Price Differential on Cooperative Surplus and Transfer Payments: Price Mean-Preserving Contraction and 
Expansion 
 Prices ($/ton)
a
 Setting Optimal strategy Expected payoffs, surplus, and transfers ($1,000/acre) 
Cases 
  
 
     
Surplus
 b
 Payment * * 
1 2892 2892 
Noncooperative no control ImNS 177 308 485 N/A N/A 177 308 
Cooperative ImNS ImNS 165 321 486 1.2
***
 0 N/A N/A 
             
2 3325 2459 Noncooperative no control ImNS 204 257 461 N/A N/A 204 257 
   Cooperative ImNS ImNS 193 269 462 0.6
***
 0 N/A N/A 
             
3 3758 2026 
Noncooperative no control ImNS 230 206 436 N/A N/A 230 206 
Cooperative ImNS ImNS 221 215 436 0.4
***
 0 N/A N/A 
 
  
          
4 4192 1592 
Noncooperative no control ImNS 256 155 411 N/A N/A 256 155 
Cooperative ImNS ImNS 249 164 413 1.7
***
 0 N/A N/A 
 
  
          
5 4625 1159 
Noncooperative no control ImNS 283 104 387 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Cooperative ImNS ImNS 277 111 388 0.7
***
 0 283 104 
 
  
          
6 5058 726 
Noncooperative no control no control 243 62 305 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Cooperative ImNS ImNS 305 59 364 59.8
***
 32 273 91 
 
  
          
7 5491 293 
Noncooperative no control no control 264 25 289 N/A   N/A N/A N/A 
Cooperative no control Col16 393 -6 387 98.2
***
 80 313 74 
 
  
          N/A is not applicable. 
a 
Recall that prices in cases 1 through 6, and prices in Case 7 are obtained through a mean-preserving contraction and  a mean-preserving expansion of prices in the baseline 
case (case 6), respectively.  
b 
Recall that the cooperative surplus is defined as the difference between  (cooperative) and  (noncooperative). 
*** 
Significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
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control, no control). The price differential in cases 6 and 7 is sufficiently large that it 
favors cooperative disease management. Case 6 is the baseline case that we discussed 
in detail in the previous section. That is, GH pays GL to spatially control the disease 
according to Strategy ImNS, in which case he implements the same strategy. In case 7, 
the price differential and cooperative surplus are even larger that GH pays GL to 
remove all 16 columns without replacement (Strategy 16col), i.e. exit production.  
Between cases 1 and 6, total payoff is monotonically decreasing in the level of 
heterogeneity (i.e., the magnitude of price differential) (figure 4). Cases 6 and 7 on the 
other hand represent a range where the relationship between price differential (more 
generally, heterogeneity) and total payoff (more generally, social welfare) becomes U-
shaped. These are also the two cases that yield a cooperative solution. Note, however, 
that although cooperation becomes Pareto-improving in this range, it also becomes 
harder to achieve as the level of heterogeneity increases. One indicator of the 
difficulty of cooperation is the ratio of transfer payment to cooperative surplus, with 
higher ratios implying more difficult cooperation. This ratio would be 0.5 in case 6 
and 0.8 in case 7 (ratios 32/60 for case 6 and 80/98 for case 7, table 3.4).  
 89 
 
Figure 4. Total payoff under the optimal solution for each of the seven price 
differential cases (price pairs ( ) in $/ton, in parentheses).  
 
   
3.7 Conclusions and Next Steps 
There is growing interest in the economics of integrated spatial-dynamic processes 
under the presence of negative externalities due to incompatible production practices 
in agriculture. In this paper, we develop a two-agent bargaining game in the context of 
a spatial-dynamic model of disease diffusion and control. We apply this model to the 
GLRD spread in wine grape vineyards and generate distributions of vineyard ENPVs 
to solve the game. Under the baseline case, if managers do not cooperate, each finds it 
optimal not to control the disease. The optimal solution is cooperative and consists of 
the high-value vineyard manager spatially controlling the disease and paying the low-
value vineyard manager to employ the same disease control strategy. Using a mean-
preserving price differential contraction, we find that cooperation is not optimal for 
smaller magnitudes of the price differential. More importantly, we find that the 
relationship between heterogeneity, as expressed by the price differential, and social 
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welfare, as measured by total payoff, is U-shaped as hypothesized by Dayton-Johnson 
and Bardhan (2002). In addition, we find that in the price range where greater 
heterogeneity increases social welfare and cooperation is optimal, the ratio of transfers 
to cooperative surplus is higher thus causing the cooperative solution to be harder to 
implement.   
 Our model is rich in modeling the vine-level heterogeneity in the disease 
diffusion process generating the externality but it is limited in its ability to model more 
than two agents with greater dimensions of heterogeneity that can affect total payoffs. 
In addition, the Nash bargaining framework used does not allow us to accommodate 
changing circumstances that can shift the bargaining power and the incentives to 
cooperate for the players over the lifecycle of their vineyards. Future research can 
model the problem in an agent-based computational model framework that allows for 
additional agents with abilities to learn over time and with greater dimensions of 
heterogeneity such as risk attitudes. This is especially relevant given the high level of 
price variability observed in the winegrape industry and the impact it can have on 
incentives to cooperate as well as on the size of the payments. More generally, such a 
framework would add to our limited understanding of collective action among 
heterogeneous players in a heterogeneous biophysical setting. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation provides an economic analysis of Grapevine Leafroll Disease, the 
most widespread viral disease in vineyards worldwide. It documents the economic 
cost of the disease at the vineyard level and recommends optimal management 
strategies with and without disease externalities. We contribute to the literature that 
employs nonspatial, compartmental models when modeling diseases by relaxing the 
simplifying assumptions that individual plants are homogenous in their attributes and 
spatially perfectly-mixed.
 
We also
 
contribute to the spatial literature by modeling 
spatial heterogeneity as dynamically determined by disease diffusion and control 
rather than specifying it as exogenous and fixed over time. We use a continuum of 
models, starting with a nonspatial, nondynamic economic analysis of GLRD in a 
single vineyard and ending with a fully spatial-dynamic model of disease diffusion 
and control within and between neighboring vineyards. We show that analyses that do 
not incorporate disease ecology parameters at the plant level in a spatial-dynamic way 
might not capture the imperfect information in disease diffusion and disease control 
and could therefore lead to suboptimal management recommendations. This 
dissertation also contributes to the public economics literature by improving our 
understanding on how inherent heterogeneity affects strategic behavior and total 
payoffs. The particular case study of an agricultural infectious disease contributes to 
the environmental and resource economics literature by modeling long-distance 
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dispersal at the plant-level, in a spatial-dynamic way as opposed to using farm-level 
specifications or fixed diffusion rates. 
 In the first essay, we find that the economic impact of GLRD can represent 
more than 75% of a vineyard’s net present value if left uncontrolled. We underline the 
value of preventing GLRD through the use of virus-tested vines. Although nonspatial 
and nondynamic, the analysis in this essay is essential as it identifies the threshold 
initial disease prevalence beyond which vineyard replacement is economically 
superior to any disease control.  
 Essay 2 starts by laying out the unique characteristics of insect-transmitted 
plant diseases such as GLRD that call for developing spatial bioeconomic simulation 
models incorporating disease ecology parameters at the plant level. The cellular 
automata model developed in this essay shows that failure to model imperfect 
information in disease diffusion and disease control through the incorporation of 
disease latency and undetectability period parameters can lead to an underestimation 
of the disease economic cost and the unrealistic prediction of disease eradication. Most 
importantly, this essay demonstrates that current nonspatial strategies recommended to 
the industry might not be profit-maximizing and highlights the superiority of spatial 
strategies. The originality of the results lies in the computational method’s ability to 
model a large number of bioeconomic, plant-level state variables. The essay also 
illustrates how the model can be used to prioritize GLRD research through the 
identification of the most critical bioeconomic model parameters. 
 Essay 3 examines how optimal disease management in a single vineyard can 
be compromised by the presence of spatial-dynamic, disease externalities and 
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evaluates the ability of bargaining and transfer payments to control these externalities. 
It does so by developing a model that embeds a computational model of disease 
diffusion within and between vineyards in a bargaining game-theoretic model of 
disease control. We find that, if neighboring managers do not cooperate, each finds it 
optimal not to control the disease. We compute the benefits to cooperation and show 
that the cooperative solution includes transfer payments and consists of each manager 
implementing the optimal spatial strategy outlined in Essay 2. The essay concludes 
with an examination of the relationship between agent heterogeneity, as expressed by 
the spatial price differential between the neighboring managers, and total payoff. We 
find that increased heterogeneity reduces the total payoff up to a point where 
cooperation becomes Pareto-improving and the relationship between heterogeneity 
and total payoff becomes U-shaped. 
 This dissertation highlights the value of conducting bioeconomic analyses at 
the individual plant level, in a spatial-dynamic way when studying plant pests and 
diseases that are similar to GLRD. It offers a modeling approach that can be used to 
examine the bioeconomics of other crop diseases characterized by spatial-dynamic 
processes. We hope that this dissertation will encourage applications of relatively new 
modeling tools and computational methods in this field. In view of the increased 
understanding of spatial-dynamic ecological processes and the recent developments in 
the spatial resource economics, it is likely that models of the sort developed in this 
dissertation will be essential to formulate agricultural, resource, and environmental 
management recommendations.      
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Yield decreased by (%): 
a. 0 (no decrease)   
b. 0-10 
c. 10-25 
d. 25-50 
e. 50 or more 
f. I don’t know 
 
 
 
Sugars decreased by (º brix): 
a. 0 (no decrease)  
b. 0-1 
c. 1-2 
d. 2-3 
e. 3-4  
f. I don’t know 
 
 
Acidity increased by (g/L):  
a. 0 (no decrease) 
b. 0-0.5  
c. 0.5-1 
d. 1-2 
e. 2 or more 
f. I don’t know 
 
 
 
APPENDIX  
Survey Instrument 
 
1. Prevalence: What percentage of your vineyard is affected by leafroll? (Highlight 
one) 
a. 0  
b. 0-10  
c. 10-25 
d. 25-50 
e. 50 or more 
f. I don’t know 
2. Varieties: What grape varieties were affected by leafroll? 
 
3. Symptoms of Leafroll Virus on Crop: In the following section, please mention 
whether you noticed a change in per vine yield, sugars and/or acidity associated 
with the leafroll virus infection. If changed occurred, please indicate the degree of 
change, if measured or estimated (highlight answer). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Changes In Agricultural Practices In Response To Leafroll Incidence:  
 Have you replanted your vineyard in response to leafroll infection? Yes  No 
(highlight one).  
 If not, have you changed any of the following practices as a response to your 
vineyard leafroll infection?  (Tick the appropriate cell). If yes, please mention 
how many units (of labor or equipment) you had to utilize on each activity as a 
result of leafroll infection 
 
 Yes No If yes, how many units (vines replanted, quantity 
fertilizer/pesticide, etc.) 
Vine replacement     
Leaf removal     
Fertilization     
Pesticide     
Other:     
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5. Contracts With Vineyards:  
 Do you buy/sell grapes from vineyards other than your own?   Yes     No 
(highlight one).  
 If yes, do you have contracts with those vineyards?                  Yes     No 
(highlight one).  
 If yes, does the contract refer to quality standards related to the sugars and/or 
the acidity of the grapes?                                                                              Yes      
No (highlight one).  
 If yes, what are those standards? Sugars:________________ 
Acidity:_____________ 
 How do you penalize (get penalized for) lower standards? 
a. No penalty for lower standards 
b. Batch is refused 
c. There is a penalty of: ___________________________________ 
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